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# **IRAN**SHIPPING REPORT

**INCLUDES 5-YEAR FORECASTS TO 2018** 





## **Iran Shipping Report Q1 2015**

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## Part of BMI's Industry Report & Forecasts Series

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## **BMI Industry View**

Our outlook for the Iranian shipping sector depends on the current rapprochement between the pariah state and the West, and the attendant relaxation of sanctions, continuing. The Iranian economy will expand slowly in 2015 as talks on the nuclear programme continue without reaching a breakthrough, and **BMI** projects real GDP growth of 2.8% in 2015, following our estimate of a 2.9% contraction in 2013 and 2.8% growth in 2014. The shipping sector will be a major beneficiary of an easing of sanctions, not only through a general recovery in the economy, but also from a fundamental perspective. The removal of port operator **Tidewater** from EU sanction lists means that international shipping companies are set to begin calling at Iranian ports such as Bandar Abbas once more. Growth will take time to recover, however, given the massive inflation seen in Iran in recent years, and the damage done to consumers' purchasing power as a result.

#### **Headline Industry Data**

- 2015 port of Bandar Abbas throughput forecast to grow by 6.7%, and average growth of 6.8% to 2019.
- 2019 port of Bandar Abbas throughput expected to reach 2.19mn twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) still insufficient to match 2011 volumes.
- 2015 total real trade is forecast to return to growth at 2.9%, and average 2.2% to 2019.

#### **Key Industry Trends**

*India-Afghan Trade To Be Boosted By New Links:* Trade volumes between India and Afghanistan will be boosted, with the long delayed Chabahar port project in Iran moving forward. The port will also offer India greater access to the Central Asian market via Iran.

European Shipping Lines Unable To Restart Operations: Foreign shipping companies have expressed eagerness to cooperate with the port of Shaheed Rajayee in Iran, according to Ali Jahandideh, deputy head of the Iranian Ports and Maritime Organisation. International shipping lines have commenced loading and unloading operations following the lifting of Western sanctions against the port.

New Shipping Service Agreement To Be Signed Soon, Says Ambassador: Iran and Oman plan to collaborate to start a new shipping service in order to boost trade between the two countries, according to the Iranian ambassador to the Sultanate, Ali Akbar Sibeveih. Talks for setting up the shipping line have been going on since March 2014 and a deal is expected to be signed within three months, stated Sibeveih.

#### **Key Risks To Outlook**

There are serious risks to all our forecasts for Iranian shipping, just as there are to our macroeconomic outlook for the country. Should the current rapprochement between Iran with the West and the US continue, there is serious upside risk to our outlook as sanctions continue to be removed. The lifting of sanctions on shipping insurance, for example, has already resulted in an increase in oil exports, and the Q314 removal of sanctions against port operator Tidewater will see container volumes at Bandar Abbas grow once more. Equally, it should be noted that if negotiations stumble, the end position could be worse than it currently is if even harsher restrictions on Iranian trade are imposed. This would generate downside risk to our forecasts.

#### **SWOT**

#### Shipping

#### Iran Shipping Industry SWOT Analysis

#### **Strengths**

- The port of Bandar Abbas managed to defy the global downturn in shipping and sanctions, posting positive growth in 2009, 2010 and 2011.
- Iran's location on the Gulf allows it access to major shipping lanes between East and West via the Strait of Hormuz.
- Iran's navy is involved in protecting Iranian vessels from pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden.

#### Weaknesses

- The Iranian economy has been seriously weakened by years of harsh sanctions, and massive inflation has reduced demand for imported container goods.
- Relations between Iran and the rest of the international community remain fraught.

#### **Opportunities**

- There is growing rapprochement between Iran and the US and the rest of the international community.
- India is developing a port in Iran.
- Insurance firms in Europe can once more insure Iranian vessels carrying crude oil, following the lifting of certain sanctions in January 2014.
- The removal of sanctions against port operator Tidewater in 2014 will boost container volumes at Bandar Abbas.

#### **Threats**

- The threat of conflict in the Strait of Hormuz remains, and Iran has threatened to close the Strait.
- Should talks fail once more, then further sanctions imposed by the international community could increase the damage to Iran's trade.

#### **Political**

#### **Political SWOT Analysis**

#### **Strengths**

- Since the overthrow of the Pahlavi family in 1979, there has been some reduction in the level of political corruption, while wealth distribution has improved marginally.
- The Revolutionary Guard and Basij militia are fiercely loyal to the supreme leader, helping to maintain social stability.

#### Weaknesses

- The country has one of the poorest human rights records in the region, and authorities do not hesitate to quell dissidents. A number of journalists and antigovernment protesters are being held in custody.
- While decision-making ultimately rests with the supreme leader, the regime is heavily fragmented, and consensus is hard to reach.
- Widespread perceptions of electoral fraud during the course of June 2009's presidential elections have damaged the regime's legitimacy in the eyes of many Iranians.

#### **Opportunities**

- The Majlis (parliament) is more than just a rubber stamp; the move by 150 parliamentarians (out of 290) to hold former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad accountable for his handling of the economy in March 2012 is a positive indication that checks exist.
- The victory of moderate cleric Hassan Rouhani in Presidential elections in June 2013 is leading to a significant improvement in relations with the West.

#### Threats

- Despite progress in nuclear talks, the prospect of further US and EU sanctions and the possibility of a military strike by the US or Israel cannot be dismissed.
- Youth unemployment is high.
- The strong influence of the Revolutionary Guards within the political and economic arena may present a challenge to reform over the long term.

#### **Economic**

#### **Economic SWOT Analysis**

#### **Strengths**

- Iran has the world's second largest proven oil reserves after Saudi Arabia, and the world's second largest proven gas reserves after Russia.
- Oil and gas aside, Iran is rich in other resources and has a strong agricultural sector.

#### Weaknesses

- Local consumption of hydrocarbons is rising rapidly; this, coupled with ageing technology in the sector, will have a negative impact on its oil and gas exporting capacity.
- International sanctions discourage foreign oil companies from bringing much-needed technical knowledge and equipment to maintain oil output levels.

#### **Opportunities**

- The gas sector remains underdeveloped, and there is considerable room to maximise this source of revenue.
- A growing population, combined with a shortage of housing, provides opportunities for investment in residential construction.

#### Threats

- A decline in global oil prices would have a marked impact on the economy. Although an Oil Stabilisation Fund exists to protect the economy at times of weaker oil prices, it has increasingly been used to fund government overspending and could be close to empty.
- Capital flight could continue, particularly should negotiations on the nuclear programme fail.

## **Industry Forecast**

### Port Of Bandar Abbas Throughput

**Short-Term: Return To Growth As Sanctions Ease** 

In 2015, we forecast that Iran's premier container-handling port of Bandar Abbas, also referred to as Shahid Rajaee since a name change in 2008, will enjoy a second consecutive year of growth, reflecting the turnaround in the country since the easing of sanctions imposed against it over the past several years. Throughput levels will remain far below previous highs however.


Over the year, we project that container-handling will grow by 6.7%, rising to 1.68mn twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). Although still a far cry from previous highs of 2.80mn TEUs, handled in 2011, if realised this will see the facility cement its return to growth; we estimated 5.6% growth in box handling in 2014.

A return to growth is a positive sign for the facility after massive declines in throughput over the past two years. In 2013, we estimate that container handling at the Gulf facility dropped by a painful 25.0%. This would mark a second year of massive box throughput declines after the 29.0% drop in volumes we estimate took place in 2012.

Our forecast for growth is predicated on both the improving macroeconomic picture and fundamentals regarding the port itself. Bandar Abbas' port operator **Tidewater** has had sanctions against it eased. At the time of writing in November 2014, it looks like international shipping firms were set to return to Iranian ports. Iran-based Tidewater Middle East Company, operator of the Iranian port of Shahid Rajaee, or Bandar Abbas, was scheduled to resume its international container services at the port on July 20. In Q311, the Iranian ports sector was targeted directly when Tidewater was added to the US blacklist. Firms such as **Maersk Line** and **MSC** were forced to call at smaller Iranian ports which are not operated by Tidewater, such as the northern facility of Bushehr.

#### **Return To Growth**

#### Port of Bandar Abbas Throughput, TEUs



e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: BMI Calculation, Port Authority

The move to resume operations came after EU sanctions against the operator were eased, which prohibited any EU person or entity from making direct or indirect payments in favour of Tidewater.

Foreign shipping companies have expressed eagerness to cooperate with the port of Shaheed Rajayee in Iran, according to Ali Jahandideh, deputy head of the Iranian Ports and Maritime Organisation. International shipping lines have commenced loading and unloading operations following the lifting of Western sanctions against the port. A Taiwanese vessel was the first to berth at Shaheed Rajayee, Jahandideh stated, and several international companies have suggested that they now plan to start loading and unloading consignments in the port on the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.

However, European shipping lines are yet to resume operations in Iran due to problems, such as the opening of Letters of Credit. Foreign shipping lines have been finding it difficult to operate in the country due to international sanctions imposed on Iran. Countries like China, South Korea, and India have announced their willingness to resume operations in Iran.

In addition to the removal of Tidewater from the sanctions list, improving relations with the West, more effective macroeconomic management under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani and low base effects will help the Iranian economy return to growth in 2014 after two consecutive years of recession. We forecast GDP to expand by 2.9% and 3.1% in real terms in 2015 and 2016 respectively, from our estimate of 2.8% growth in 2014.

Economic expansion will remain gradual over the coming quarters. We believe negotiations between the P5+1 (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany) countries and Iran over its nuclear programme will continue over the coming quarters, with no major breakthrough on the cards. Moreover, key oil and banking sanctions are expected to remain in place (*see 'Nuclear Talks: Protracted Negotiations Likely', February 26 2014*). Oil sanctions in particular will continue to negatively impact Iran's shipping sector, through reducing throughput at its ports and reducing demand for its liquid bulk shipping companies.

Consumer spending will remain modest over the coming quarters, and we expect expansion of 4.0% in 2015. The inflationary environment will improve, but persistently elevated price pressures will continue to hit purchasing power. We project consumer price index (CPI) inflation to average 23.0% in FY2014/15 (fiscal year running from March 21 2014 to March 20 2015) and 21.0% in FY2015/16, compared with 35.6% in FY2013/14. Moreover, the government will be unable to increase current spending significantly in 2015, as it seeks to improve its fragile fiscal position by cutting subsidies and limiting previously universal cash subsidies to only low-income families (*see 'Inflationary Environment Improving In 2015', September 18 2014*). The failure to reach a breakthrough in nuclear talks will also somewhat temper confidence in the economy among domestic and international investors.

The slow recovery in consumer spending will prevent a rapid rebound in container throughput at Iranian ports. Nevertheless, the outlook is far brighter than it has been for some time.

#### Medium-Term: An Improving Outlook

Over our forecast period from 2015 to 2019, we project that annual container throughput growth at Bandar Abbas will average growth of 6.8% per annum. This would take 2019's handling figure to 2.19mn TEUs. We note that the forecast average growth rate is considerably less than the 13.0% average between 2007 and 2011, and is indicative of the continuing structural challenges to the Iranian economic recovery.

Our core view sees negotiation over Iran's nuclear programme continuing over the next few years, with no major breakthrough on the cards and key oil and banking sanctions remaining in place (see 'Nuclear Talks: Protracted Negotiations Likely', February 26 2014). As a result, the Iranian economy will expand below potential in 2015. There exists considerable risk to this projection should sanctions be eased, though further escalations of political violence in the Gulf region could also have a negative effect on Bandar Abbas' throughput.

This outlook would make the work currently being undertaken at the port look premature. The port's capacity is being doubled to 6mn TEUs a year from the current 3mn. Given our pessimistic forecast, we do not believe the existing capacity will be changed for some time to come, let alone that a capacity of 6mn TEUs is warranted. However, given the previous expansion record at the port, with consecutive years of double-digit growth, it is possible this will be needed in the future.

There is some upside for the port. Bandar Abbas is set to become the biggest cotton transit terminal for Central Asia, following the establishment of a private sector loading and offloading unit. The authorities have completed 3km of railroads and work on the remaining 3km is 40% complete, according to Ali Estiri, the head of the Ports and Shipping Office in Hormuzgan province. The facility is set to cost IRR280bn (USD22.44mn) and will have loading and offloading capacity of 800,000 tonnes of cotton annually. The goods, including cotton, minerals, mazott, chemical fertilisers, oil derivatives and aluminium, will be transported to South East Asia and Persian Gulf countries.

#### Long-Term: Dependent On Ongoing Rapprochement

The long-term outlook for Bandar Abbas depends on how the current rapprochement plays out. Should the Iranian regime under President Rouhani continue to accede to the key demands of Western powers, thereby securing an easing of the economic sanctions in place against Iran, we could see activity at Bandar Abbas pick up considerably. However, should these talks fail, the result could be worse than the situation prior to this most recent thawing of relations. Sanctions could be escalated, hitting the Iranian economy, pushing up inflation and driving down throughput at Bandar Abbas.

Table: Major Ports Data (Iran 2012-2019)											
	2012	2013	2014e	2015f	2016f	2017f	2018f	2019f			
Port of Bandar-e abbas container throughput, TEU	1,986,886.8	1,490,165.1	1,573,614.4	1,679,559.1	1,786,410.5	1,904,313.5	2,037,615.5	2,188,399.0			
Port of Bandar-e abbas container throughput, TEU, % y-o- y	-29.0	-25.0	5.6	6.7	6.4	6.6	7.0	7.4			

e/f = BMi estimate/forecast. Source: BMI Calculation, Tidewater

Table: Trade Overview (Iran 2012-2019)								
	2012	2013	2014e	2015f	2016f	2017f	2018f	2019f
Real import growth, % y-o-y	-19.01	-12.00	7.00	5.50	5.00	4.50	4.00	4.00
Real export growth, % y-o-y	-27.51	-10.00	5.00	0.20	-0.19	0.00	0.00	-1.00
Real total trade growth, % y-o-y	-23.26	-11.00	6.00	2.85	2.40	2.25	2.00	1.50
Imports, USDbn	89.72	97.25	104.93	113.01	121.72	131.11	141.24	152.16
Import growth, % y-o-y	9.15	8.39	7.90	7.70	7.71	7.72	7.72	7.73
Exports, USDbn	111.42	120.25	128.85	138.33	148.79	160.29	172.83	186.43
Export growth, % y-o-y	8.17	7.93	7.15	7.35	7.56	7.73	7.82	7.87
Total trade, USDbn	201.14	217.50	233.78	251.34	270.51	291.41	314.07	338.59
Total trade growth, % y-o-y	8.61	8.14	7.48	7.51	7.63	7.72	7.78	7.81

e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: National Statistical Authority

Table: Key Trade Indicators (Iran 2012-2019)											
	2012	2013	2014e	2015f	2016f	2017f	2018f	2019f			
Agricultural raw materials, imports, USDmn	1,148.93	969.95	990.49	1,032.39	1,086.86	1,155.49	1,252.48	1,331.05			
Agricultural raw materials, imports, % y-o-y	-27.44	-15.58	2.12	4.23	5.28	6.31	8.39	6.27			

Key Trade Indicators (Iran 2012-2019) - Continued											
	2012	2013	2014e	2015f	2016f	2017f	2018f	2019f			
Agricultural raw materials, exports, USDmn	267.58	255.31	256.25	254.86	254.27	252.47	251.16	252.51			
Agricultural raw materials, exports, % y-o-y	-14.08	-4.59	0.37	-0.54	-0.23	-0.71	-0.52	0.54			
Ores and metals, exports, USDmn	3,801.25	2,875.59	2,943.38	2,843.57	2,801.70	2,672.92	2,578.57	2,675.56			
Ores and metals, exports, % y-o-y	-20.80	-24.35	2.36	-3.39	-1.47	-4.60	-3.53	3.76			
Ores and metals, imports, USDmn	986.56	1,011.98	1,073.64	1,107.58	1,152.04	1,204.60	1,273.40	1,325.01			
Ores and metals, imports, % y-o-y	3.23	2.58	6.09	3.16	4.01	4.56	5.71	4.05			
Iron and steel, exports, USDmn	1,039.76	1,545.65	2,100.55	2,206.47	2,351.54	2,492.94	2,635.80	2,713.31			
Iron and steel, exports, % y-o-y	33.73	48.65	35.90	5.04	6.57	6.01	5.73	2.94			
Iron and steel, imports, USDmn	8,915.00	13,252.48	18,010.27	18,918.40	20,162.25	21,374.65	22,599.50	23,264.12			
Iron and steel, imports, % y-o-y	-18.50	48.65	35.90	5.04	6.57	6.01	5.73	2.94			
Manufactured goods, exports, USDmn	11,269.02	8,045.83	8,210.83	7,967.89	7,865.96	7,552.51	7,322.83	7,558.93			
Manufactured goods, exports, % y-o-y	-13.12	-28.60	2.05	-2.96	-1.28	-3.98	-3.04	3.22			
Manufactured goods, imports, USDmn	47,679.15	38,114.92	38,855.45	40,366.14	42,330.03	44,804.54	48,301.84	51,134.65			
Manufactured goods, imports, % y-o-y	-7.20	-20.06	1.94	3.89	4.87	5.85	7.81	5.86			
Fuels, exports, USDmn	76,767.13	69,560.55	70,627.89	69,056.35	68,396.94	66,369.22	64,883.44	66,410.75			
Fuels, exports, % y-o-y	-19.64	-9.39	1.53	-2.23	-0.95	-2.96	-2.24	2.35			
Fuels, imports, USDmn	2,691.91	2,897.71	2,897.62	2,897.44	2,897.20	2,896.90	2,896.47	2,896.12			
Fuels, imports, % y-o-y	118.05	7.65	0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01			

e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: UNCTAD

Table: Main Import Partners, 2004-2012											
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
United Arab Emirates, USDmn	5,476	7,285	8,980	10,081	14,762	12,629	22,446	28,956	29,824		
United Arab Emirates, USDmn, % of total	16.6	18.7	22.1	22.3	25.3	25.4	33.8	30.2	32.2		
China, Mainland, USDmn	1,623	2,411	2,585	3,883	5,122	4,276	5,733	16,277	12,766		
China, Mainland, USDmn, % of total	4.9	6.2	6.4	8.6	8.8	8.6	8.6	17.0	13.8		
Turkey, USDmn	693	856	804	1,147	1,510	1,794	3,806	3,949	10,914		
Turkey, USDmn, % of total	2.1	2.2	2.0	2.5	2.6	3.6	5.7	4.1	11.8		
Korea, Republic Of, USDmn	1,774	2,135	1,913	2,342	3,118	3,137	3,687	6,686	6,882		
Korea, Republic Of, USDmn, % of total	5.4	5.5	4.7	5.2	5.3	6.3	5.6	7.0	7.4		
Germany, USDmn	4,114	5,119	5,215	5,181	5,627	4,617	4,484	4,504	3,459		
Germany, USDmn, % of total	12.5	13.2	12.8	11.5	9.6	9.3	6.8	4.7	3.7		
TOTAL	33,013	38,904	40,686	45,168	58,343	49,741	66,395	96,002	92,605		
TOTAL, top 5 countries, USDmn	13,680	17,806	19,497	22,634	30,138	26,452	40,157	60,371	63,846		
% from top 5 trade partners	41.4	45.8	47.9	50.1	51.7	53.2	60.5	62.9	68.9		

Source: IMF. N.B. Total imports is from Direction of Trade Statistics, consequently there may be some discrepancy with data used elsewhere in this report

Table: Main Export Destinations, 2004-2012											
	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012		
China, Mainland, USDmn	4,077	6,178	9,042	12,118	17,801	12,021	16,578	27,514	22,663		
China, Mainland, USDmn, % of total	9.9	11.2	11.9	13.6	14.9	16.2	16.8	21.4	22.1		
India, USDmn	333	572	5,360	9,176	12,730	9,613	10,101	10,469	12,231		
India, USDmn, % of total	0.8	1.0	7.1	10.3	10.7	12.9	10.2	8.1	11.9		
Turkey, USDmn	1,783	3,154	5,115	6,013	7,454	3,096	6,950	11,329	10,877		
Turkey, USDmn, % of total	4.3	5.7	6.8	6.7	6.2	4.2	7.0	8.8	10.6		
Korea, Republic Of, USDmn	2,214	3,214	4,590	5,893	7,476	5,223	6,309	10,303	7,768		
Korea, Republic Of, USDmn, % of total	5.4	5.8	6.1	6.6	6.3	7.0	6.4	8.0	7.6		
Japan, USDmn	7,515	9,362	9,887	11,599	16,587	8,461	10,147	11,688	7,238		
Japan, USDmn, % of total	18.3	17.0	13.1	13.0	13.9	11.4	10.3	9.1	7.1		
TOTAL	41,002	55,167	75,718	89,358	119,523	74,263	98,939	128,733	102,496		
TOTAL, top 5 countries, USDmn	15,921	22,480	33,994	44,798	62,048	38,414	50,085	71,302	60,777		
% from top 5 trade partners	38.8	40.7	44.9	50.1	51.9	51.7	50.6	55.4	59.3		

Source: IMF. N.B. Total exports is from Direction of Trade Statistics, consequently there may be some discrepancy with data used elsewhere in this report

### **Market Overview**

### Iran Container Shipping Market Overview

Iran's largest container handling facility is the port of Bandar Abbas, located on the Iranian northern bank of the Strait of Hormuz - the entrance to the Gulf. The facility has little trade as a regional transhipment hub given the well established Gulf Cooperation Council facilities in the region. Despite this, it has maintained a sizeable throughput and has managed to enjoy strong growth in the years up to 2011. However, with sanctions against Iran taking an ever greater toll on the country's economy, we believe that the port's growth trajectory came to an end and that 2012 and 2013 were years of huge throughput declines. Nevertheless, we estimate that the recovery began in 2014 and that it will continue in 2015, as growing rapprochement between Iran and the international community has seen sanctions against the country softened.

#### **Key Views**

- Iran's score on the Liner Connectivity Index could return to growth in 2015 following recent dramatic falls.
- Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines and its affiliates dominate Iran's container shipping, though they have suffered from numerous sanctions.
- Sanctions are also being directed at Iran's premier container ports.
- Demographics bode well for continued growth in containerised imports.
- The impact of sanctions on Iran's economy and the ports and shipping sectors will continue to drive down volumes until an agreement is reached with the West.

#### **Connectivity Falling**

Iran's connectivity with container shipping services as measured on UNCTAD's Liner Connectivity Index, had been, in tandem with container throughput at Bandar Abbas, climbing up to 2011. From a score of just 13.69 in 2004, when the index began (with China setting the base rate of 100), Iran's connectivity for container shipping rose to 30.27 in 2011 (having peaked at 30.73 in 2010). This slight fall indicates that the sanctions that had been imposed up to then had not made a huge impact upon Iran's container shipping sector.

However, in 2012 Iran's score on the Liner Connectivity Index had fallen down to 22.62. This is unsurprising given the escalation in sanctions against the country. The West has been exerting pressure upon the Islamic republic over its nuclear development programme. Although Iran maintains that this is for peaceful, energy purposes only, the concern in the US, EU and UN is that the country is looking to develop

nuclear weapons, and sanctions against the country's banking and financial services, oil and gas and transport sectors have been implemented in a bid to prevent a nuclear Iran.


This decline continued in 2013, though not to the level that might have been expected given the country's ongoing problems. Iran's score dropped to 21.30 from 2012's 22.62. However, **BMI** notes that the score for the year is awarded early on in the calendar, and certainly before July 1, when the US strengthened its sanctions against the country, with new provisions specifically targeting the Iranian shipping and ports sectors. The result has been that all major container shipping lines have now ceased calling at Iranian ports, even those Chinese and Taiwanese firms that had carried on in spite of previous measures (European lines such as market leader **Maersk Line** and number-two **Mediterranean Shipping Company** (MSC) had ceased calling at the pariah state in 2012). As we predicted in previous reports, Iran's score took a dive in 2014, dropping to just 5.85.

At the time of writing, it looks like international shipping firms were set to return to Iranian ports. Iran-based **Tidewater Middle East Company**, operator of the Iranian port of Shahid Rajaee, or Bandar Abbas, was scheduled to resume its international container services at the port on July 20. In Q311, the Iranian ports sector was targeted directly when Tidewater was added to the US blacklist. Firms such as Maersk Line and MSC were forced to call at smaller Iranian ports which are not operated by Tidewater, such as the northern facility of Bushehr.

The move to resume operations came after EU sanctions against the operator were eased, which prohibited any EU person or entity from making direct or indirect payments in favour of Tidewater. The port will receive a Taiwanese vessel on July 20 and another on July 25, according to Ali Jahandideh, deputy director of the Ports and Maritime Organization of Iran. More ships from India, China and South Korea are expected to call at the port in the future. In 2014 we forecast that container throughput growth at 5.6%, following two years of massive contraction.

#### **Losing The Connection**

#### Iran's Liner Connectivity Index Score, 2004-2014



Source: UNCTAD

#### **International Sanctions Easing**

Improving relations with the West, more effective macroeconomic management under the presidency of Hassan Rouhani and low base effects will help the Iranian economy return to growth in 2014 after two consecutive years of recession. The Iranian economy will expand slowly in 2015 as talks on the nuclear programme continue without reaching a breakthrough, and project real GDP growth of 2.8% and 2.9% in 2014 and 2015 respectively, from our estimate of a 2.9% contraction in 2013.

Economic expansion will remain gradual over the coming quarters. We believe negotiations between the P5+1 (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany) countries and Iran over its nuclear programme will continue over the coming quarters, with no major breakthrough on the cards. Moreover, key oil and banking sanctions are expected to remain in place (*see 'Nuclear Talks: Protracted Negotiations Likely', February 26 2014*). Oil sanctions in particular will continue to negatively impact Iran's shipping sector, through reducing throughput at its ports and reducing demand for its liquid bulk shipping companies.

Improving relations with the West, as well as Rouhani's pledge for macroeconomic reform, will contribute to an acceleration in consumer spending over the coming quarters. However, private consumption growth will only be gradual; we expect expansion of 5.0% in 2015. For one, we project consumer price index (CPI) inflation in Iran to average 25.0% in FY2014/15 (fiscal year running from March 21 2014 to March 20 2015) and 19.0% in FY2015/16, compared with 35.6% in FY2013/14. Despite the relative improvement, the inflationary environment will remain unfavourable to a rapid expansion of consumer spending, particularly as the government seeks to improve its fragile fiscal position by cutting energy and potentially food subsidies (*see 'Inflationary Environment Improving In 2014 and 2015', June 25 2014*). Moreover, nuclear talks will fail to produce a breakthrough over the coming quarters, a factor that will somewhat temper confidence in the economy in 2015. The slow recovery in consumer spending will prevent a rapid rebound in container throughput at Iranian ports.

#### **Struggling Back To Growth**





e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: UN, BMI

#### **IRISL** - Target For Sanctions

Iran's exposure to the container shipping sector is dominated by the country's state-owned shipping line, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), which operates in the dry bulk, general cargo and container shipping sectors. The line's box operations mainly link Asia and Europe to the Arabian Gulf and the Indian subcontinent. The national carrier ensures that rates are kept competitive, with other international lines serving Iran's trade needs.

However, the line's connection to the Iranian state is also its curse and it is normally the first target of sanctions. A set of sanctions agreed in May 2010 called for vigilance against Iran's main international freight transport companies, IRISL and Iran Air, with a ban mooted that would make it illegal for countries to harbour vessels suspected of shipping banned goods into Iran. In practice, BMI expects the call for vigilance to mean more stops and searches of IRISL vessels - a development that Iran has reacted strongly against. Iran's Majlis (parliamentary) speaker Ali Larijani has stated: 'I am warning the US and certain adventurous countries that in case they plan to inspect the cargo of Iranian ships and planes, they should rest assured that we will do the same.'

The threat of stops and searches in our view damages the growth prospects of the Iranian container shipping sector. We believe that shippers will not want to use a company that has effectively been blacklisted by a number of states. The US placed direct sanctions against the carrier in 2008, banning all transactions between the company and US citizens, and freezing IRISL assets that are under its jurisdiction. The UK in 2009 ordered all UK financial service firms to cease business with Iran under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Reports have also emerged that UK and Bermuda-based insurance companies have stopped doing business with IRISL, with the company having to search elsewhere for insurance.

On October 27 2010, the US applied sanctions on 37 'front companies' related to IRISL. According to the US statement, the action 'targets IRISL's complex network of shipping and holding companies and executives and further exposes Iran's use of its national maritime carrier to advance its illicit weapons of mass destruction program and to carry military cargoes'.

This continued up to the end of December 2011, when the US Treasury Department imposed sanctions on 10 US shipping and front companies for having links to Iran's military and missile building programmes. The Malta-based companies have been linked to IRISL and its two subsidiaries, **Irano Hind** and **ISI**Maritime (we note here that Irano Hind, a joint venture (JV) between IRISL and the **India Shipping**Corporation, ceased operating in 2012 as a result of sanction pressures). Treasury official David Cohen

said that the sanctions were an indication of the US government's avowed determination to stop the illicit transportation of military cargoes by the Iranian regime.

The sanctions have also derailed IRISL's new-build strategy. The line has struggled to secure financing as banks around the world have become wary of violating any sanctions on dealing with the shipping company or its affiliates. This led to a number of its vessels being detained in Singapore at the end of 2010. The three ships, the *Tuchal*, *Sabalan*, and the *Shand* were all registered to different companies and were held over mortgage-default payments.

However, **BMI** notes that all three vessels were released in January 2011 on the order of Singapore's High Court, leading IRISL to claim to the Financial Times that it was in good health: 'We definitely face no risk in Asia,' said Mohammad-Hossein Dajmar, the company's managing director, though he acknowledged that IRISL is in effect shut out of European ports.

Adam Szubin, head of the US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control, which is responsible for implementing the sanctions, insisted that the sanctions were working, and stated that the ships were only released after the company repaid in full the USD200mn outstanding on the debt: 'Its successive loan defaults and its threadbare insurance coverage have left it facing massive debts on the ships it is sailing, and unable to pay for ships it has ordered.'

Despite the considerable sanctions imposed upon it, IRISL had managed to continue to pull into European ports. But from February 2012, this became much harder. Of IRISL's 144 vessels, 60 have been sailing under flags of convenience from Malta and Cyprus. However, according to Reuters, the two Mediterranean island states were moving towards 'deflagging' IRISL ships to be in accordance with the wider sanctions programme. Maltese foreign minister, Tonio Borg, told Reuters: 'We believe that all services to IRISL should be prohibited. We are ready to make that sacrifice, provided that all countries also make the sacrifice.'

However, in July 2013 the company confirmed that the scope of its operations has been scaled back. The company has been forced to discontinue its trade routes between Europe, East Asia and the Persian Gulf, after the service lines were blocked by US sanctions restricting US-Iran trade. Following the sanctions, only the firm's Gulf-East Asia route has been unaffected.

As with all facets of Iran's container shipping sector, the growing rapprochement between it and the West provides upside potential for IRISL's business, should sanctions against it be lifted. Nevertheless, at present these sanctions remain intact, and the container carrier will have a long way to go to rebuild its business.


#### **Potential For Rebound Once Sanctions Lifted**

Until the marked ramp-up in sanctions pressures over the past two years, Iran's box shipping sector was looking strong. Iran's demand for containerised shipments defied the global downturn in box trade, with container throughput at the Port of Bandar Abbas increasing by an average 14.6% each year from 2008 to 2010, when facilities all around the world suffered drops in throughput as global containerised shipping declined for the first time since its advent in the 1960s. Even in 2011, when Bandar Abbas port operator Tidewater was added to US sanctions lists the port still managed to secure throughput growth of 8.0%.

When compared with the other major container ports in the Middle East, Bandar Abbas ranks fifth out of nine, behind the UAE's Jebel Ali, Oman's port of Salalah, Saudi Arabia's port of Jeddah and Egypt's East Port Said. **BMI** notes that the majority of these ports (Jebel Ali, Salalah and East Port Said) are transhipment hubs. Bandar Abbas has not developed its transhipment potential, so throughput at the port has been a good indication of the domestic demand for containerised goods in Iran.

#### **Massive Impact Of Sanctions**

#### Port of Bandar Abbas Throughput, TEUs



e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: Tidewater

Unsurprisingly, given that the country has an estimated population of 76.40mn in 2013 - the largest in the Middle East - demand for containerised goods was strong. Iran's demographics further support its positive consumer outlook, with the country boasting a young population - the demographic group that typically has more disposable cash and inclination to spend. According to **BMI** estimates, 63.5% of Iran's population is younger than 35 years old in 2013. By 2022, according to **BMI** forecasts, the total population will have risen to 82.00mn. The proportion of young consumers will have dropped, however, with just 51.3% of the population projected to be under 35 in 2022, with potentially negative implications for continued containerised goods demand. Iranian private final consumption accounts for much of the country's GDP, making up an estimated 42.6% of total GDP in 2012. This is low in comparison to many other countries, however, as a result of the contribution of hydrocarbon exports to the total, and so there is significant scope for growth.

While all of these factors are making less impact on the Iranian box shipping story at present, with the West-led sanctions being the driving force, we believe that they will help the sector recover once the current impasse is lifted and sanctions against the country cease. This recovery will not be immediate (as noted above, the Iranian consumer will remain weak for some time) but there is underlying support for container throughput growth from the underlying demographics in the Middle Eastern country.

## **Industry Trends And Developments**

#### India-Afghan Trade To Be Boosted By New Links

The Indian government's approval of the long stalled plan to develop the Chabahar port in Iran, will create a critical transit route between India and Afghanistan. As part of this plan, the government will float a company which will then lease two fully constructed berths in Chabahar over an initial period of ten years. The company will invest USD85.2mn to prepare the berths for use by late 2015 - one of which is to operate as a container terminal and the other as a multi-purpose cargo terminal. The initial phase will be set up in co-operation with the Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) and Kandla Port Trust (KPT), affiliates of two of India's major state owned ports, as well as the Iranian government.

The port will give India greater access to the Afghan market via a direct sea-land access route through Iran's Eastern borders thereby allowing India to circumvent its neighbouring rival Pakistan. The port will serve as a critical transit route for supply chains between India and Afghanistan, which already share security and economic ties. At present, land-locked Afghanistan conducts nearly all of its trade through Pakistan, shipping in and out predominately through the port of Karachi. As longstanding rivals, Pakistan has sought to minimise India's trade role in Afghanistan by blocking off access to the country via Pakistan's borders. The development of a port in Iran will eliminate the need for goods traded between Afghanistan and India to transit through Pakistan and will ultimately boost India-Afghan trade - which has already grown considerably over the past decade, from USD41.0mn in 2001 to USD726.7mn in 2013.

The deal will also allow India to develop its supply chains with Iran and Central Asia. Iran and India are working together on the development of the port and Indian goods bound for Afghanistan and Central Asia will benefit from preferential treatment and tariff reductions achieved through the port of Chabahar. In addition, if negotiations to ease or end long standing international sanctions weighed against Iran are successful, international trade with Iran would increase and with it, its role as a gateway for trade. By investing now, India stands to gain from first mover advantage, positioning itself at the forefront of this development. In addition to this, India will also benefit from greater supply chain links with the growing economies of Afghanistan and Central Asia.

Chabahar is all set to receive large cargo vessels following a dredging operation, according to a statement issued by deputy head of Ports and Maritime Organization Ali Jahandideh. The dredging project allows the port to handle huge ships with capacities of up to 80,000 tonnes. Jahandideh stated that the port is expected

to dock a 50,000 deadweight tonne cargo ship loaded with grain in the next two weeks. The port is surrounded by a free trade zone and its location allows it to provide access to landlocked Afghanistan.

#### Russian Cargo Ship Berths At Astara Port

A 5,000-tonne Russian cargo ship, *Pyotr Strelkov*, berthed at the Iranian port of Astara on October 16, according to a statement by Astara Port Manager, Rasoul Bahrami. The cargo vessel, loaded with 1,175 packs of raw medium-density fibreboard, left the port of Astrakhan in Russia three weeks back, stated Bahrami. The port of Astara has handled more than 100,000 tonnes of goods from 40 vessels since March 2014.

#### **European Shipping Lines Unable To Restart Operations**

Foreign shipping companies have expressed eagerness to cooperate with the port of Shaheed Rajayee in Iran, according to Ali Jahandideh, deputy head of the Iranian Ports and Maritime Organisation. International shipping lines have commenced loading and unloading operations following the lifting of Western sanctions against the port. A Taiwanese vessel was the first to berth at Shaheed Rajayee, Jahandideh stated, and several international companies have suggested that they now plan to start loading and unloading consignments in the port on the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.

However, European shipping lines are yet to resume operations in Iran due to problems, such as the opening of Letters of Credit. Foreign shipping lines have been finding it difficult to operate in the country due to international sanctions imposed on Iran. Countries like China, South Korea, and India have announced their willingness to resume operations in Iran.

#### Shahid Bahonar Port Posts 231% Rise In Non-Oil Exports

Iran's Shahid Bahonar port's exports of non-oil goods rose by 231% year-on-year (y-o-y) to 28,470 tonnes during March 21-September 22, according to Qassem Askari-Nasab, a deputy at the Ports and Maritime Organization of Shahid Bahonar. In the reported period, the port exported around 985,178 tonnes of oil and non-oil products. In the current year, the port has handled 1,604 twenty-foot equivalent units, which represents a rise of 2.5% y-o-y.

#### New Shipping Service Agreement To Be Signed Soon, Says Ambassador

Iran and Oman plan to collaborate to start a new shipping service in order to boost trade between the two countries, according to the Iranian ambassador to the Sultanate, Ali Akbar Sibeveih. Talks for setting up the shipping line have been on since March 2014 and a deal is expected to be signed within three months, stated Sibeveih. The shipping line will operate between four Omani ports - Sohar, Sultan Qaboos, Musandam and Shinas - and the Iranian ports of Chabahar, Bandar Abbas, Bandar Imam Khomeini and one other port, Sibeveih added.

#### Bushehr Port Registers 61% Rise In Container Throughput

The Iranian Port of Bushehr registered a nearly 61% y-o-y rise in container throughput to 180,839 twenty-foot equivalent units in the first half of the current Iranian year started March 21, according to the provincial Ports and Shipping Department Director General Mohammad Rastad. In the reported period, the port posted a 20% y-o-y rise in commodity throughput to 2.7mn tonnes, according to Rastad. The port recorded a 7% y-o-y increase in the number of oceangoing vessels that transited the port to 241 in the same period.

#### Port City Of Jask To Have Oil Terminal

The government of Iran intends to construct an oil terminal in the port city of Jask with an investment of around USD2.5bn, according to a statement issued by Pirouz Mousavi, managing director of the **Iranian**Oil Terminals Company. The construction will involve the development of storage tanks, loading and unloading wharves as well as single-point moorings. In addition, the construction will include onshore and offshore facilities. For the project, the government may invite bids from the Iranian private sector and foreign companies. The terminal is expected to reduce export costs and shorten the distance for oil delivery.

#### **Government Seeks Investment To Develop Ports**

The Iranian government is seeking investment from domestic and international investors for the development of ports in the country's southern and northern regions, according to Roads and Urban Development Minister Abbas Akhoundi. The government aims to expand the southern ports' capacity by 6mn tonnes from the current 30mn tonnes and plans to enhance infrastructure by connecting southern ports with northern ports, Akhoundi said. The government will need support from the private sector to meet the target. According to Akhoundi, international ties will enhance the Iranian ports' trade network in the global market.

## **Company Profile**

## Islamic Republic Of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)

#### **Strengths**

- Throughput at Iranian ports continued to grow through the downturn.
- IRISL is state-owned.

#### Weaknesses

- IRISL has had severe operational difficulties as a result of sanctions against it.
- The company has had a number of its ships impounded over payment issues.
- Iran's political isolation limits the company's ability to attract new investment funds and acquire the latest technology.
- Partly owned subsidiary Irano Hind Shipping Company has ceased operations.

#### **Opportunities**

 The return of Iran to the negotiating table could see sanctions against Iranian shipping companies slackened.

#### **Threats**

- Should current talks ultimately fail, sanctions against Iran and IRISL may be further strengthened, making it impossible for the company to operate at a profit.
- Middle East unrest continues. Should Iran undergo widespread political turmoil it would impact on IRISL's business.
- Given political and trade restrictions IRISL may lose market share to other Gulf and Middle Eastern shipping lines.
- 150 of IRISL's subsidiaries and affiliated companies have now been added to the US's blacklist.

#### Company Overview

Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) was founded out of Aria Shipping in 1979 following the Islamic Revolution. Many of the company's vessels were lost during the Iran-Iraq war, and subsequently, IRISL's vessels have been named after the war's 'martyrs and cities', according to the liner's website. It is involved in container and dry bulk shipping and has some 7,000 employees.

Group subsidiaries include the Khazar Shipping Lines, which provides marine transportation services in the Caspian Sea area, calling at Bandar Anzali, Nowshahr and Amirabad to the ports of Aqtau, Astrakhan, Makhachkala, Turkmenbashi and Baku. Valfajre-8 Shipping Company transports cargo and passengers between countries in the Gulf and Oman Sea. The group has more than 110 representative offices. Until July 2012, the Irano Hind Shipping Company was run by IRISL as a joint venture with Shipping Corporation of India. The company owned eight ocean-going vessels that transported crude oil, bulk and general cargoes, however, the company's operations ceased as a result of pressures stemming from Western sanctions, and in April 2013 the company's vessels and debt were taken on by Shipping Corporation of India.

#### Strategy Fleet

IRISL is involved in container and dry bulk shipping, though the company has been transferring its shipping operations to associated companies of late in a bid to evade Western sanctions. According to the company's website, its dry bulk arm has a fleet of varying sizes, from Panamax to Handysize. It is involved in the shipping of both clean and dirty products such as grain and rice and coal and iron ore.

In late 2009-early 2010, IRISL transferred its container shipping operations to hitherto unknown company Hafiz Darya Shipping Lines (HDS Lines). The company is said to be privately owned and separate from IRISL, though little information is available regarding its management structure. According to AXS Alphaliner, HDS Lines currently operates the 23rd-largest container shipping fleet in the world, with a total of 22 vessels making up a total of 88,608TEUs. This gives the company 0.5% of market share.

HDS Lines owns just three ships, having acquired one more in Q114, with a combined capacity of 6,864 TEUs. It charters in 19 vessels, however, with a total capacity of 81,744 TEUs. Its chartered vessels account for 92.3% of the fleet. Despite this disparity, there are no vessels currently on HDS Lines' orderbook, reflecting the poor position Iranian shipping companies are in when it comes to finding funding.

#### Iranian Ports Forced To Look For Investment At Home

Although the company has been active in trying to separate its shipping activities from the IRISL brand, it is still acting as an investment vehicle in the shipping sector. In 2010, it signed an agreement to control and invest in the Iranian Pars Port Complex. BMI believes Iranian ports now have no choice but to look for investment from domestic sources, especially with Tidewater, operator at Bandar Abbas, now the subject of sanctions. However, with sanctions against Iran set to continue it may be some time before investors see any returns.

Under the terms of the transfer, IRISL will take over the operation of seven docks and is to invest IRR400bn (USD40mn) in the port's infrastructure and establishments. The Pars Port Complex is situated in the Pars Special Energy/Economic Zone (PSEEZ), in Bushehr Province in south-western Iran. The complex sits on 100 square kilometres of land and incorporates a number of petrochemical complexes and refineries. The

contract between IRISL and PSEEZ will initially run for 15 years, and can be extended thereafter in five-year periods.

BMI believes that this contract has obvious benefits for the Iranian shipping company, giving it the chance to move up the supply chain and diversify into port management. The shipping line has been singled out as a target for sanctions, and is no doubt hoping the port will offer it an opportunity to diversify its revenue stream.

IRISL has had sanctions imposed directly against it by the US, which believes that the company provided logistical services to Iran's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces Logistics (MODFL). Under the sanctions, the Iranian national carrier is banned from making transactions with US citizens, and all IRISL assets under US jurisdiction have been frozen.

BMI believes that the PSEEZ had no option but to sign the agreement with IRISL. Given the sanctions, and diplomatic pressure put on any companies still prepared to invest in Iran, there was little option but to look for investment at home. In January 2010, pressure from the Israeli government convinced German supply chain logistics consultancy Hamburg Port Consultancy (HPC) to pull out of a contract signed in January 2010 to renovate the Iranian Port of Bandar Abbas.

#### Latest Activity Sanctions Relief Extended

Sanctions relief from the US, UK, Germany, France and Russia under the Joint Plan Of Action (JPOA) have been extended through to November 24. This gives the two sides longer to reach agreement over Iran's nuclear programme, and extends the suspension of sanctions aimed at sectors including shipping. This will be of benefit to IRISL.

#### **IRISL Ready To Rebuild Fleet**

It was reported in July 2014 that IRISL was ordering 10 new bulk carriers from Chinese shipyard Yangzijiang Shipbuilding. The order is worth USD300mn, and the 82,000 DWT vessels are scheduled for delivery in 2017. The Iranian shipping company is looking to rebuild its aging fleet as it looks towards the lifting of sanctions against it after six years. The deal has yet to be confirmed by the yard.

## NITC

#### **Strengths**

- NITC is the eighth-largest oil tanker company in the world.
- It has a diversified fleet with different classes of vessel, including a large number of very large crude carriers (VLCCs).

#### Weaknesses

- NITC's association with Iran causes problems for the company.
- The tanker operator struggled to renew its insurance in 2011 as a result of sanctions.
- Elevated bunker costs have impinged on shipping companies' profits.
- NITC has been targeted directly by Western sanctions.

#### **Opportunities**

- Iran could become a major exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG) if it manages to develop the expertise in the face of sanctions.
- NITC has a major fleet expansion programme in motion.
- The exit of major tanker operators from Iran has seen demand for NITC's tankers soar.
- NITC once more has access to international insurance.
- EU sanctions against NITC have been annulled in October 2014.

#### **Threats**

- Middle Eastern political instability is a major concern.
- The liquid bulk shipping sector is already struggling with overcapacity and NITC's new VLCCs will exacerbate this.

Company Overview NITC was formerly known as the National Iranian Tanker Company prior to its rebranding in 2010 in an effort to distance itself from the Iranian pariah state and the Western sanctions currently imposed upon it. It is a major tanker operator, primarily involved in the shipping of crude oil, and operates on the international stage.

#### Strategy Fleet

According to Tanker Operator's top-30 tanker companies list, NITC's fleet makes it the seventh-largest in the world in terms of deadweight tonnage (DWT). However, there are question marks over the actual size of the company as its vessels are being renamed and reflagged in a bid to avoid sanctions.

According to NITC's managing director Ali Akbar Safaei, talking in February 2014, NITC's fleet now stands at 67 oil tankers, with a capacity of 16mn DWT. He said that the fleet had grown by 2mn DWT over the previous 18 months, despite ongoing US-engineered sanctions against it and Iranian oil exports.

BMI notes that the company did have the most ambitious expansion plans in the sector, with a programme that should have taken it into third place in the world in terms of DWT. This included the acquisition of 22 additional VLCCs by 2011-2013, six Caspimax shuttle tankers for use on the Caspian Sea, one LPG carrier and two product carriers.

However, we believe that the sanctions in place against the company and Iran will have made it difficult to operate; there are reports that many of its ships are being used as floating storage as Iran is unable to export all of its oil due to sanctions, and has not cut back on production entirely. As such the fact that the shipping company has still managed to increase its fleet by such a considerable amount over the 18 months to February 2014 is impressive.

Now that several sanctions against the company's operations have been suspended in January 2014 - namely those which prevented the firm from finding insurance for its vessels - NITC can resume exporting oil to China, India, Turkey, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. As such, provided that ongoing negotiations do not hit a stumbling back, the future could well be bright for NITC.

The company also has long-term plans to become involved in LNG shipping. Iran has proven gas reserves and once the country has the technology to enter the sector, NITC has stated that it will develop a fleet to transport it. The company has previously stated that 80-plus vessels would be needed to cope with demand.

#### **Sanctions Hit Crude Shipping Sector**

NITC was finally added to the US's sanctions list in July 2012, having managed until then to avoid the ignominy shared by so many other Iranian shipping companies. The US and the EU have been steadily increasing sanctions against the Middle Eastern country in a bid to halt its alleged nuclear weapons development programme, a charge Iran denies. The other stalwarts of Iran's shipping sector, Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and terminal operator Tidewater had both been on the list for some time, as had numerous subsidiaries and front companies for IRISL's operations.

NITC's vessels had previously been flagged and registered in European countries Cyprus and Malta. The invigoration of the EU's Iranian sanctions necessitated a relisting by the tanker operator in recent months, however, and since July half of NITC's fleet have been both renamed and flagged to new countries, notably Tanzania and Pacific nation Tuvalu. Now those vessels flagged to these states have once again found themselves delisted as the US has brought pressure on the two countries and both have proceeded with deregistration. The Tuvalu ship registry stated: 'We expect the deregistration process to be completed in the shortest time practicable to ensure the safety of the vessels.' Thirty-six vessels had been flagged in Tanzania's semi-autonomous island of Zanzibar, meaning it will have become increasingly difficult for NITC to operate. The company's fleets will likely soon have to flag to Iran, with the problems that would bring.

Howard Berman of the US House foreign affairs committee said: 'Iran is learning the hard way that we will not relent in applying crippling sanctions on the regime, and others are learning that evading international sanctions is a losing strategy.'

#### **Access To Insurance Market Regained**

The EU Council Decision of January 23 2012 put a ban on the import, purchase or transport of Iranian crude oil and petroleum products for EU member states. Crucially, the decision, which came into force in July 2012, also banned the provision of finance, insurance or reinsurance related to these activities, whether that is directly or indirectly. Around 95% of crude oil tanker insurance is carried out by the European P&I Club of insurers, either directly or through the reinsurance market, and foreign companies formerly engaged in carrying Iranian crude found themselves unable to do so save those limited instance where national governments have provided state insurance.

However, with the growing rapprochement between Iran and the West since the election of relative moderate President Hassan Rouhani (who replaced hard-line nationalist Mahmoud Ahmedinejad), some sanctions against Iran have been eased. These include that which restricted Iranian access to international P&I insurance. As a result, things are looking brighter for NITC, and other firms that transport Iranian oil - such as Indian shipping company Mercator Lines. The easing of these sanctions will also help boost Iran's oil exports, and help rebuild its battered economy.

#### Latest Activity EU Sanctions Annulled

Sanctions against NITC imposed by the EU in 2012 were annulled in November. A court ruling by the General Court had declared that the sanctions were unlawful and there were no grounds on which to blacklist the shipping company. The EU had argued that the tanker firm was owned by the Iranian government or Revolutionary Guards, while the company had argued that it is privately owned. A failure by the EU to contest the court ruling meant that the sanctions against NITC have now been removed.

NITC managing director, Ali Akbar Safaie, said of the decision: 'We are relieved to see the lifting of these sanctions. We have always enjoyed good business relationships with our EU partners and look forward to resuming those now this difficult period has come to an end.' The shipping firm remains on US sanctions lists however.

# **Shipping - Global Industry View**

## Container Shipping Demand:


Demand in the container shipping sector will continue to increase in 2015 in line with the improving global economic outlook. The uptick aids the sector's recovery, but with supply inflows remaining robust overcapacity will be an ongoing issue in 2015.

**BMI** forecasts growth globally to expand by 3.2% year-on-year (y-o-y) in 2015, a strengthening on the real GDP growth outlook estimated for 2014 at 2.8% y-o-y. Specific indicators for container shipping highlight how this global growth outlook will transfer into increased demand in the sector, with **BMI**'s throughput forecasts for container volumes at the world's top five largest box ports projected to expand by 4.4% y-o-y in 2015.

This 2015 growth projection of 4.4% marks a strengthening on 2014's estimated throughput growth at the top five ports globally (Shanghai, Singapore, Shenzhen, Hong Kong and Ningbo-Zhoushan), of 4% y-o-y. This growth projection at the world's bellwether container ports highlights the improving demand outlook in the container shipping sector which has, since 2009, battled weakened demand coupled with robust supply that has caused overcapacity. While we believe that overcapacity will remain an issue in 2015 (a topic we will cover in greater detail in our container shipping supply outlook), the continued pickup in demand indicates that the sector is getting nearer equilibrium and so the outlook for global container shipping is brightening.

## **Box Bellwether Throughput Growth Continues**

Top Five Global Container Ports Container Throughput (TEU) and % change y-o-y



Source: e= BMI estimate. f= BMI forecast.


The Chinese port of Ningbo-Zhoushan is projected to join the top five global ports in 2014. The port replaces the port of Busan as the number five global port, with the South Korean transhipment hub due to slip to sixth position. The move highlights a trend that **BMI** has previously noted of Chinese ports becoming better connected on box shipping routes and so recording greater levels of throughput. We witnessed the trend playing out in 2013, when the Chinese mainland port of Shenzhen overtook Hong Kong, China's main transhipment hub.


## Slow But Steady Growth For Asia-Europe

Demand on the Asia-Europe trade route will continue its slow but steady trajectory, on the of back of low growth levels in European economies. Volumes on the Asia-Europe route will therefore benefit from the continued recovery in the Eurozone and continued improvements in the economic outlooks for Europe's top three largest economies; Germany, the UK and France.

2015 is set to mark the Eurozone's second consecutive year of growth after two years of recession, with **BMI** projecting growth to strengthen from an estimated y-o-y increase of 0.7% in 2014 to 1.2% in 2015.

## **Back To Recovery**





f = BMI forecast. Source: National Statistics, Eurostat


Europe's three largest economies, Germany, the UK and France will drive the steady uptick in demand for container shipping on the Asia-Europe trade route. Projected growth in France and Germany will remain low at 0.7% and 1.4% respectively in 2015, but both of these forecasts mark an estimated y-o-y strengthening in economic growth from 0.4% in 2014 for France and 1.2% for the same year in Germany.

The UK's economic growth remains the outperformer out of the three, with real GDP projected to expand by 2.4% y-o-y in 2015. This will mark a slight slowing on the 3.1% y-o-y increase estimated for 2014, but **BMI** highlights that this is due to the country settling back into a sustainable growth rate over the medium term.

Consumer sentiment in Europe, having witnessed an uptick in the middle of 2014 has dipped once more toward the end of the year. In October 2014 the European Commission's Business and Consumer Survey recorded a 7.4 point dip in European consumer sentiment. However, this decline can be viewed more positively in that it marks a month-on-month weakening in the decline posted in September, when the survey recorded an eight point drop and in a year-on-year comparison, as in October 2013 the survey recorded a 14.5 point drop.

## **European Consumer On A Bumpy Ride**

## **European Commission Consumer Confidence Index**




Source: European Commission's Business and Consumer Survey

The impact of the European recovery is starting to be felt at the Northern European ports, which are the main transhipment hubs and gateways for goods into the region. **BMI** estimates container throughput to stage a robust recovery at Europe's top three container ports (Rotterdam, Hamburg and Antwerp) in 2014, with volumes estimated to reach a total of 30.7mn TEU, a y-o-y increase of 4.3% up from a y-o-y growth of 0.3% in 2013. **BMI** forecasts this robust growth outlook to continue in 2015 and strengthen slightly to 4.9%.

## **Box Growth Picking Up At Northern European Majors**

## Container Throughput (TEU and % Change y-o-y



Source: e= BMI estimate. f= BMI forecast

The European demand outlook is improving, but container shipping lines must remain vigilant. The dampening in consumer sentiment highlights that while demand is steadily ticking back up, the recovery is in its early stages and it will be a slow journey with the potential for bumps in the road.


## Consumer Confidence Uptick To Drive Transpacific Demand

The continuing improvements in the US economic growth story, specifically with the returning confidence in the consumer sector, will drive demand on the transpacific trade route. **BMI** forecasts US real GDP to strengthen in 2015, with a y-o-y growth of 2.7% projected on an estimated 2.3% increase for 2014.

Vitally for the container shipping sector, US consumer appetite is picking up. Latest data from the University of Michigan Survey of Consumer Confidence Sentiment highlights the improving outlook for US consumer demand, with the survey recording a score of 86.4 in October 2014, its highest point in 2014 for the year-to-date and a y-o-y increase of 18% on the survey's score of 73.2 in October 2013. The score of 86.4 in October 2014 is the highest level that the survey has recorded in seven years, with this score last being achieved in July 2007.

## **US Consumer Shopping Once More**

#### University of Michigan Survey of Consumer Confidence Sentiment




Source: Bloomberg

Improving consumer demand will directly filter through to the box shipping sector, with the US West Coast ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach (the country's gateways for container trade from Asia) already showing the impact. In 2014 we estimate that total box volumes at these facilities will increase by 4.8% to reach 15.3mn TEUs - a strengthening on the 3.4% increases recorded in 2013. In 2015 we project a further throughput y-o-y expansion of 4.1%. The slight slowing in our growth projection for 2015 is due to the threat from current congestion at the ports continuing into the first quarter of Q115 and so placing a drag on the port's operations and throughput levels. 2015 will however, according to **BMI**'s throughput forecasts mark the year that the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach set a new milestone in box throughput levels. We predict that the ports will handle a total of 15.9mn TEUs in 2015. The previous milestone for the ports was in 2006 when the facilities handled 15.76mn TEUs.

## **Back To Recording New Milestones**

Port of Los Angeles and Long Beach Total Container Throughput and Previous Throughput Milestone (2006)




e/f= BMI estimate/ forecast. Source: Port Authorities

## **China Consumer Offers Growing Demand Market**

China's expanding middle class is offering a further driving force for container shipping demand. The country's push to diversify its economy has led to the country's import growth outpacing that of its y-o-y export increases and this is benefitting container shipping with more goods being imported into the country by box. This demand is set to continue, as although China's economic growth is slowing, projected to expand by 6.7% in 2015 compared to an estimated 7.3% in 2014, this level of growth is outpacing that of other more developed consumer markets.

## **Growing Consumer Sector**

#### **China Consumer Spending Per Capita (USD)**



e/f= BMI estimate/ forecast. Source: National Sources/BMI

China's growing importance as an import market for containers, rather than just an export point is highlighted by the growing trend we are witnessing, where the country is becoming better connected to global box shipping routes and its role of ports on the global container shipping market. Chinese shippers are decreasing their use of transhipment hubs, a fact felt by the ports of Hong Kong and South Korea's Busan.

While Chinese ports already played a major role in container shipping from an export stand point, the growing level of Chinese imports has led to greater traffic throughput through these ports and has lifted their standing in the container shipping sector. In 2010 the port of Shanghai overtook the port of Singapore to dominate as the world's busiest container port. This was followed by the port of Shenzhen overtaking the port of Hong Kong in 2013 to become the world's third largest container port by throughput. The trend is projected to continue, with **BMI** forecasting the Chinese port of Ningbo-Zhoushan to overtake the fifth placed port of Busan by end-2014.

# Container Shipping Supply:


Capacity management for the global container fleet will need to continue in 2015, despite the strengthening demand outlook. The number, and vitally, the size of new containership capacity continues to increase and 2015 is set to mark the influx of even more mega vessels as carriers boost the size of the box ships that they operate.

**BMI** believes that the industry's capacity management tactics will remain firmly in place. We will therefore see an increase in the number of idle and scrapped vessels as well as an uptick in both the use of slow steaming and capacity management through alliances.

Volume levels, measured by both number of ships and vessel capacity are continuing to increase year-on-year (y-o-y), and although 2014 has marked a very slight weakening in this growth, the volume of vessels currently under construction at shipping yards globally indicates that there will be a strengthening in the global box fleet over the next couple of years. In October 2014 (latest available data) the global container fleet reached 225mn DWT, this marked a 5.1% y-o-y increase, a very slight weakening in growth of the global fleet, which stood at 5.3% y-o-y in October 2013. The number of vessels in service is also continuing to expand, growing by 0.8% y-o-y. This marks a slight strengthening from the 0.1% increase recorded in October 2013. The trend of capacity growth in the global container shipping fleet outpacing vessel number growth continues to highlight the emphasis that the industry is placing on larger ships.

## No Let Up In Fleet Growth

#### Global Containership Fleet (000 DWT)



Source: Bloomberg

**BMI** believes that a further strengthening in global fleet growth will get underway in 2015, with a greater volume of box ships due online. Containerships that are currently under construction at shipyards globally number 98, an uptick of 12.6% y-o-y from 87 vessels in October 2013. These ships are at varying levels of construction and are likely to be launched over the next two years (18 months is the traditional construction time for a box ship). **BMI** notes that it is not only the extra number of vessels that are due online, but the extra capacity that they will add to the sector. The strategy of adding ever larger containerships to fleets shows no sign of letting up. **United Arab Shipping Company** (UASC) will be the latest box ship operator to join the 18,000TEU operator club in 2015, with it due to start welcoming the first of its fleet of six 18,000TEU vessels in H115. The company also has 11 14,000TEU capacity vessels due for delivery starting at the end of 2014 and proceeding through 2015. The largest capacity vessel that the company previously operated was 13,500TEU, a prime example of the massive ramp up in capacity that is underway in the sector.


The projected increase in vessel numbers and volumes, will be utilised by increased demand for container shipping globally (see: Container Shipping Demand: Improving Global Growth To Increase Box Shipping

*Volumes*), but **BMI** believes that the uptick in demand will not be strong enough to solve the issue of overcapacity that has plagued the container shipping sector since 2009. The sector's capacity management strategies will therefore continue into 2015, with slow steaming and idling of vessels now industry norms and likely to be used extensively in 2015 to moderate the impact of the capacity uptick.

Both instruments of capacity control have been utilised in 2014. Between January-October 2014 the average speed of a containership stood at 9.75 knots - a 3.2% decrease in the shipping speed of 10 knots recorded for the same period in 2013 - as the industry continued its capacity management strategy of slow steaming. The decrease in speed is however starting to weaken, with the y-o-y decline in speed standing at 3.6% y-o-y in January-October 2013, which in turn marked a weakening on the 7% y-o-y decline recorded for the same period in 2012. The question the industry will now face is just how much slower can containerships go and if we start to see 9.75knots as the lowest speed, will this speed be low enough to continue having an impact on managing capacity?

## **How Much Slower Can They Go?**

## **Average Containership Speed (knots)**




Source: Bloomberg

If slow steaming has reached a plateau point and ships are unable to go any slower, then the industry will likely seek to ramp up its other main strategy of capacity management - idling ships. In October 2014 the

number of containerships at anchor (which gives some indication of idle vessel numbers) stood at 734 vessels - a y-o-y increase of 1.2% compared to the anchored fleet of 734 box ships is October 2013. This level of idling will likely increase in 2015 in order to balance out the new supply of ships that are set to join the market.

**Ships Remaining Idle** 

## **Number Of Containerships Anchored Globally**




Source: Bloomberg

Another strategy that offers a much more permanent solution to overcapacity is scrapping. **BMI** highlights that this strategy appears to have lost some of its appeal in 2014, but might need to be increased again in 2015 to manage the influx of new capacity. In October 2014 the number of containerships scrapped reached 1,019 vessels, a y-o-y increase of 20.3%. This increase, however, marked a slowing in scrapping activity y-o-y, with October 2013 ship break-up levels expanding by 30.9% y-o-y. Considering the uptick in demand in 2014 the slowing in scrapping activity is understandable, with ship owners unlikely to take the drastic step of permanently removing tonnage when they feel the market is improving, a view that could change in 2015 as a new flood of supply increases the risk of overcapacity.

## **Scrapping Set To Strengthen**

#### **Global Containership Break Ups (Number Of Vessels)**



Source: Bloomberg

The continued use of alliances by shipping lines is also set to have a positive impact on capacity management in 2015. Alliances on the Asia-Europe and Trans-Atlantic trade routes cannot discuss rates due to anti-trust rulings by the EU, but alliances do have the ability to manage capacity.

2015 will mark the start of new alliances and with them, new options for capacity control on the major container trade routes. **Maersk Line** and **MSC** are joining up to create **2M**, which will operate on the carriers Asia-Europe, transpacific and transatlantic routes. The partnership plan was created following the rejection of **P3 Network** earlier in 2014. **CMA CGM** - which was due to join P3 - is joining up with **UASC** and **CSCL** on the transpacific and Asia-Europe routes. Previously UASC and CSCL were not members of an alliance.

Table: Alliance Overview		
Alliance Name	Alliance Members	Alliance Routes
2M	Maersk Line	Asia-Europe
	MSC	Transpacific
		Transatlantic
Ocean 3	CMA CGM	Asia-Europe
	UASC	Transpacific
	CSCL	
СКҮНЕ	COSCON	Asia-Europe
	K' Line	Transpacific
	Yang Ming	Transatlantic
	Hanjin Shipping	
	Evergreen Line	
G6	APL	Asia-Europe
	Hapag-Lloyd	Transpacific
	Hyundai MM	Transatlantic
	MOL	
	NYK Line	
	OOCL	

Source: BMI

Alliances now dominate in the container shipping sector top 20. Out of the top 20 carriers globally, 16 are members of an alliance, while the other four operate vessel sharing agreements with their peers, a mechanism that also offers capacity management.


## Container Shipping Rates: Fuel Surcharges To Kick Off 2015

With new low sulphur fuel environment regulations coming into force on January 1 2015, fuel surcharges will lead the rates push at the beginning of the year as carriers aim to cover this extra cost of fuel. General rate increases will remain a strategy for lines to push rates higher throughout the year and while overcapacity will remain a threat, the projected uptick in demand will offer a better balance between supply and demand and so a more conducive environment for increases to be accepted by shippers.

The beginning of every year traditionally marks a push by container lines to increase rates via general rate increases (GRIs), as carriers seek to stem the decline of rates from the holiday period and prepare the industry for further rate increases in February to coincide with the uptick in demand associated with Chinese New Year. At the beginning of 2014 a rate increase drive by carriers on the Asia-Europe and Transpacific routes led the Shanghai Containerised Freight Index (SCFI) to increase by 5.6% week on week (w-o-w).

## **Rates Ready For New Year Uptick**

#### **SCFI Comprehensive Index**




Source: SCFI

January 2015 will also witness a rate push, but rather than the traditional GRI, carriers will instead be raising rates to cover extra fuel charges following the launch of new low-sulphur fuel surcharges. This will push rates higher, but is a reactive move by the shipping lines to cover an extra cost that they will now face, rather than a strategy implemented by lines to improve their profit margins. The fuel surcharge will make it difficult for carriers to also push for a GRI at the beginning of 2015, as shippers will accept one increase not two. **BMI** therefore believes that carriers will have to wait until February 2015 for unleash a GRI in the run up to the Chinese New Year, when demand for space on container ships increase as shippers try and clear their export merchandise prior to a week long holiday period.

The fuel surcharges being launched are a response to regulations concerning Emission Control Areas (ECAs), which are coming into force on January 1 2015 and will cover the coastline in Northern Europe, the Baltic Sea and North America US East and West Coast. Under the new regulations container lines will be required to use fuel with a maximum sulphur content of 0.1%, which means using marine gasoil (MGO) rather than the currently used IFO grades. MGO is a cleaner source of fuel, but due to the fact it has been refined to a higher capacity, it is more expensive. According to data from Bunkerworld the price of MGO at the port of Rotterdam is approximately 60% higher than the cost of IFO380 at the same port.

MGO To Increase Fuel Costs

November 17 2014 Prices Of IFO 380, IFO 180, MGO For Selected Markets



Source: Bunkerworld


Proposed fuel surcharges vary depending on the route. On the Asia-US trade route shippers will face fuel surcharges of USD67 per FEU for goods destined for East Coast ports and USD53 per FEU to US West Coast destinations. On the Asia-Europe trade route fuel surcharges range from USD30 to USD50 per FEU.

Although GRI's will likely be held off due to the push to realise fuel surcharges at the beginning of 2015, they will likely remain a key strategy for the industry, primarily on the Asia-Europe trade route, as although demand is increasing, supply remains robust and so overcapacity and the need to manage freight rates remains.

The recovering demand picture and the positive impact this is having on rates is evident in year to date (YTD) rates data from the Shanghai Containerised Freight Index (SCFI). From January 1 2014-November 7 2014 (last available data) the SCFI Comprehensive Index recorded an average of 1,077.9, a y-o-y decline of 0.2%. This y-o-y drop in rates, however, marks a slowing in y-o-y decline compared to the 15.4% dip recorded for the same period for the SCFI Comprehensive Index in 2013.

# Rates Stabilising

#### SCFI Comprehensive Index & % chg y-o-y



Source: SCFI

The driver of the decline in rates for the YTD in 2014 has been the Transpacific trade route, where rates have dropped by 5.5% y-o-y to an average of USD1,953. While down, rates on the route again highlight the trend of improvement, with the drop weaker in y-o-y terms compared to the fall of 10.9% in the same period in 2013. Lines operating on the transpacific, the majority of which are members of the Transpacific Stabilisation Agreement (TSA), are set to implement a new strategy to boost rates in 2015 - with carriers that are members of the TSA set to move to minimum contract rate level over that of GRIs. TSA members are seeking to fix contract rates at or above USD2,000 per FEU, with these base rates more fully taking into account the cost of loading and handling, specifically the rising cost of intermodal transport. **BMI** believes that this new strategy teamed with the steady recovery in US demand will enable carriers to push up rates and decrease the level of volatility in the market.

On the Asia-Europe trade route the improvement in demand, has led to an uptick in freight rates, with carriers able to boost container shipping rates by 14.2% in the y-t-d to USD1,204.5 per TEU compared to USD1,055 per TEU in the same period in 2013. The continuing improvement in the demand outlook in Europe will enable further rate increase success in 2015.

# **Global Company Strategy**

## Maersk Line

#### Overview

Maersk Line is the main container shipping unit of highly diversified shipping and energy conglomerate AP Moller-Maersk Group. The group's other box shipping subsidiaries are MCC, which operates its intra-Asia route network, Safmarine, which transports boxes to and from Africa and the Middle East, intra-Europe carrier Seago Line and intra-Americas-dedicated SeaLand.

The company is based in Denmark but boasts a global presence, in 125 countries. It has around 32,400 employees.

Maersk is the largest container shipping company in the world, boasting a total fleet capacity of 2.8mn twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) and one of the largest box shipping networks. It is heavily exposed to Asia-Europe but is increasing its role in intra-Asia trade, where it already possesses expertise in the form of MCC.

## **SWOT Analysis**

#### Strengths

- As the world's largest container shipping line, Maersk has a greater share of global seaborne container volumes than any other carrier.
- Its large, expanding fleet offers it the ability to capture trade volumes.
- Maersk is part of AP Moller-Maersk, a diversified company with activities in the oil & gas and terminal-operating sectors that synergise with its shipping operations.
- Flexibility as a result of fleet size and type.
- The company has a raft of strategies it can call on during the current depressed environment in the container sector, including laying up vessels and super slow-steaming.

#### Weaknesses

- The dominance of the Asia-Europe trade route (accounting for 24% of volumes carried in 2012) in Maersk's service portfolio leaves the company heavily exposed to a downturn on this route.
- With such a large fleet, Maersk is constantly running the risk of overcapacity, which could be a drain on resources if business slows.
- Its presence in the oil & gas and terminal operating sectors means Maersk risks an overreliance on the sector as an integrated whole. This could be dangerous if one sector's activities fail to hedge the other (for example, if oil prices are at odds with bunker prices).

## **Opportunities**

- The company is increasing its exposure to intra-Asia trade, which is widely considered to offer huge growth potential for the container shipping sector.
- It looks set to remain number one in the container shipping sector and has cemented its position as a global leader with an order for 20 18,000TEU vessels.
- The line's focus on emerging market routes is wise, not only as a diversification strategy from overexposure to the 'big money' routes, but also as a way to enter potentially high-growth markets early.

#### **Threats**

- Overcapacity fears still plague the container shipping market.
- The trend of alliances and partnerships could put pressure on Maersk Line's market share, as its rivals
  join forces.
- The company trades in kroner, which means it is vulnerable to changes in the US dollar.
- Although the group operates in the oil & gas sector, disparities in the price of oil and bunker costs threaten profits.

## **Strategy**

Maersk continues to dominate the global container shipping sector, holding a 15.1% market share, according to AXS Alphaliner. This is still some way above its nearest rival, Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC), which boasts a market share of 13.5%.

## **Routes**

The company offers 10 transpacific services and nine Asia-Europe services. Maersk is also heavily committed to intra-Asia trade, mainly through its subsidiary MCC, which operates the group's intra-Asia services.

In terms of volumes handled on Maersk's services, Asia-Europe dominates. In 2012 (latest such data available) the route accounted for 24% of the total, the same as in 2011. West and Central Asia is the second largest route, accounting for 17% of the total. Africa accounts for 15% of the total; Safmarine operates in this area with a focus on the transportation of containers to and from Africa and the Middle East. Transpacific trade accounts for 15% and Latin America for 14%, while intra-Asia currently makes up just 7%. BMI expects intra-Asia's role in Maersk's service portfolio to increase over the medium term, with the company - along with its peers - putting huge emphasis on the growing demand between Asian states.

While holding its dominant position on the big money trade routes, Maersk is also increasing its exposure to emerging trade routes (ETRs). These include intra-Asia, intra-Europe and West Africa. BMI considers this a wise strategy, as competition continues to expand on the Asia-Europe and transpacific routes, pushing rates down. As well as offering diversification away from the big money routes, ETRs offer both less competition and high growth potential. There are, of course, obstacles, as there tend to be in emerging market-focused activities. However, Maersk's tactic of hiving off specific units, as in the case of intra-Asia MCC, is a sound strategy, in BMI's view. We also highlight the lack of infrastructure at many of the ports on ETRs and note Maersk's strategy of overcoming this by developing vessels with on-board cranes, thus negating a risk in operations.

#### Fleet

Maersk has the largest fleet in the world in terms of capacity with 2.8mn TEUs, comprising 589 ships. The fleet's dynamics are fairly evenly split between owned and chartered, at 56% and 44% respectively. Although the company charters in less capacity than it owns, it charters in more vessels, with the chartered fleet standing at 337 ships, compared with its owned fleet of 252 vessels. Maersk appears to have a strategy of chartering smaller vessels while owning and operating larger ones. This could be because of the prestige of owning a large fleet, but BMI believes it is also partly because there is a larger global supply of smaller vessels, which Maersk can charter in as needed.

The largest share of Maersk's fleet, both in terms of number of owned and chartered vessels and their TEU total, comprises 8,000TEU+ vessels. The company has also invested heavily in larger vessels and owns 11 of the world's largest container vessels afloat - three 18,000TEU Triple-E class, and eight 15,000TEU 'E' class.

Maersk is implementing a strategy that should, in the medium term, ensure it remains the market leader in terms of capacity. The company originally ordered 10 18,000TEU vessels, but later doubled that number. The first 11 vessels were delivered by August 2014; the remaining nine are scheduled for delivery in 2014

and 2015. Maersk did have the option to take another 10 18,000TEU vessels, but decided to let it lapse. BMI notes that while volumes on the Asia-Europe route have picked up after the downturn, ordering vessels that can only operate on one route heightens risk.

#### **Financial Results**

#### Q214 & H114

Maersk Line reported a net profit of USD547mn in Q214, compared to Q213 figure of USD439mn. AP Moller-Maersk said that this improvement was achieved despite 2.7% lower total revenue per forty-foot equivalent unit (FEU) and thanks to 4.4% lower unit costs supported by higher bunker efficiency and a volume increase of 6.6% to 2.396mn FEUs.

This brings H114 net profit to USD1,001mn, with the liner increasing its expected full-year result from just 'being above 2013 result' of USD1.5bn to 'significantly above the 2013 result'.

#### Q114

Maersk Line posted a net profit of USD454mn in Q114, more than doubling the Q113 figure of USD204mn. Such improvement was achieved despite a 5.1% decrease in freight rates, as the bottom line benefited from lower bunker price and impairment reversal of USD72mn. Unit costs were down 9.0%, and container volumes increased by 7.3% to 2.2mn forty-foot equivalent units (FEUs).

#### Q413 & 2013

Maersk Line's Q413 revenue was down 1.1% y-o-y to USD6.45mn, despite a 10% growth in volumes to 2.2mn FEUs as rates decreased by 6.5% to 2,662USD/FEU. As a result, Maersk Line reported a profit - net operating profit after tax (NOPAT) - of USD313mn for Q413, a y-o-y decrease of 6.6% compared to Q412.

Revenue for the year declined by 3.4% to USD26.2bn, despite volumes increasing from 8.5mn FEUs in 2012 to 8.8mn FEUs in 2013. NOPAT more than tripled, increasing from USD461mn in 2012 to USD1.5bn. The improvement was attributed to lower unit costs (USD2,731 per FEU including VSA income in 2013, compared to USD3,054/FEU in 2012) through the continuous focus on operational cost savings mainly from vessel network efficiencies, active capacity adjustments and improved vessel utilisation', and was also supported by lower bunker price (USD595 per tonne, compared to USD661).

## Q313 & 9M13

Maersk Line's profit in Q313 was up 11.2% y-o-y from USD498mn to USD554mn. A.P. Moller-Maersk Group attributed such improvement to lower costs. Maersk Line's volumes increased by 10.6% to 2.3mn FEUs. Increased volumes and an average deployed fleet capacity decreased of 0.8% resulted in improved vessel utilisation and unit costs lower by 13.0%. Freight rates were down 12.2%.

Maersk Line was expecting their 'result for 2013 to be significantly above 2012 (USD461m) based on the strong result for the first nine months of USD1.2bn.'

Maersk Line's volume in the first nine months of 2013 was up 3.0% to 6.7mn FEUs, while the average freight rate decreased by 7.0%.

#### Q213 & H113

Maersk Line's profit amounted to USD439mn in Q213 - a y-o-y increase of 93.4% on USD227mn in Q212. The AP Moller-Maersk Group explained such significant improvement by lower costs during the period. Volumes were up 2.1% to 2.2mn FEUs, while average freight rate was down 13.1% and total cost per FEU fell by 12.7%. According to the group, the cost decrease was mainly due to vessel network efficiencies and lower bunker price. The total fleet capacity of Maersk Line decreased by 0.9%.

In the first half of 2013, Maersk Line's revenue was down 4.9%, y-o-y, from USD13.634bn to USD12.964bn. The company posted a USD643mn NOPAT for the period, compared to a loss of USD372mn in H112. As in the case of Q213 performance, the significant improvement in the financial performance in H112 was achieved, according to the group, through lower costs mainly driven by vessel network efficiencies and lower bunker price. The volume was down 1.0% to 4.3mn FEUs, while the average freight rate decreased by 5.0%.

#### Q113

Maersk Line posted a net profit of USD204mn in the first quarter of 2013, compared with net loss of USD599mn in the corresponding period of 2012. With revenue unchanged at USD6.3bn as a result of a y-o-y freight rate increase of 4.7% offset by a 4.0% decrease in volumes, such an improvement in the bottom line was attributed to lower costs.

According to AP Moller-Maersk Group CEO Nils Andersen, as reported by American Shipper, Maersk Line has controlled expenses by reducing capacity and had 28 idle ships at the end of Q113 - the equivalent of some 6.5% of its fleet.

#### Q412 & 2012

Maersk Line's revenue in Q412 increased by 2.5% y-o-y to USD6.52mn, despite a 9.1% fall in volumes to 2mn FEUs and thanks to a 6.6% growth in the freight rate. As a result, Maersk Line recorded a NOPAT of USD335mn, compared with the USD593mn loss it recorded in Q411, and was also helped by fall in the bunker fuel price from USD658 to USD604 per tonne.

Revenue for the year was up 8.0% to USD27.1bn, and volumes increased from 8.1mn FEUs in 2011 to 8.5mn FEUs in 2012. Cost reductions, surcharges collection and 1.9% higher average rate y-o-y led Maersk Line back to the black, posting a NOPAT of USD461mn in 2012 compared to a loss of USD553mn in 2011.

According to the company, it gained market share for the full year, but saw a declining share through H212.

#### Q312 & 9M12

In Q312 Maersk Line's revenue increased by 5.7% y-o-y to USD6.96bn. The main driver behind this increase was a 5.7% increase in the freight rate, which averaged USD3,022 per FEU over Q312, as volumes carried remained static y-o-y, at 2.1mn FEUs.

On the back of this, Maersk Line recorded a profit of USD498mn - an improvement on the USD289mn loss in Q311. The profit was accomplished not only by increased revenue, but by a fall in operating costs, specifically the bunker fuel price - down 1.2% y-o-y to an average of USD648 per tonne in Q312.

The positive result in Q312 enabled Maersk Line to record a profit of USD126mn in 9M12. Over the first nine months of 2012 the firm's revenue increased by 9.9% to USD20.6mn, with volumes growing by 10.2% and freight rates by 0.24%. Bunker prices, while down in Q312, were elevated for the other two quarters, up 11.9% for the period.

## Q212 & H112

Maersk Line's net profit in Q212, while a positive signal, was not enough to drag the carrier back into the black for the first six months of 2012. The profitable second quarter was achieved due to success in pushing

up rates on the Asia-Europe route, to which the company is most exposed. The limited success of the sectorwide rate increase the company implemented on the route in Q312, however, offered downside risk to the firm's ability to turn a profit for the whole of 2012.

In Q212 Maersk Line recorded a net operating profit of USD227mn, up from a USD95mn loss in Q211. The Q212 profit was enough to wipe out the loss in Q112, with the line recording a net operating loss of USD372mn, down from a profit of USD329mn in H111.

Maersk Line's revenue in Q212 increased by 16.7% y-o-y to USD7.3bn, with Q212 results outperforming those the company posted in Q112 and with H112 revenue increasing by 12.2%.

Maersk Line's revenue increase in Q212 was driven by the increase in volumes, with the carrier shipping 10% more boxes than in Q211, and the uptick in rates, with the company's average freight rates increasing by 4.2% y-o-y in Q212. Operating costs remained high, as although the bunker price ticked down in Q212, it was still up y-o-y, with Maersk Line posting an average bunker price increase of 10.3% in Q212 and 19.6% in H112.

Vitally for Maersk Line, Q212 rate increases were successful on the Asia-Europe route, the trade route to which it is most exposed, accounting for 24% of its operations. Maersk Line boosted rates on the route by 14%, but this was not enough to wipe out the rate declines in Q112, with rates on the trade route down 8% y-o-y.

## Q112

Despite freight volumes increasing by 22.2% in Q112, enabling Maersk Line's revenue to grow by 7.4% yo-y, the company remained in the red, recording a loss of USD599mn. The company was dragged down by the 9% decline in rates and the high price of bunker, with the price of fuel increasing by 30.9% in Q112.

BMI believes that the depth of Maersk Line's loss was mainly due to its exposure to Asia-Europe. In terms of revenue generation, the trade route was the worst-hit, with the average rate declining by 21% y-o-y. In fact, Maersk Line's main route exposure, measured in distribution of volumes across its networks, in all but one case recorded rate declines in Q112. Rates on the Asia-Europe trade route, which accounts for 37% of Maersk Line's operations, fell 21%. The Latin America and transpacific routes, which account for 14% and 11% respectively of Maersk Line's network, recorded y-o-y rate declines of 8% and 5% respectively. Africa coverage, which accounts for 15% of Maersk Line's operations, posted a rate increase, but this was just 2% y-o-y.

#### 2011

Despite Maersk Line's revenue increasing by 4.5% y-o-y from USD24bn to USD25.1mn, and transported volumes increasing by 11%, the company still posted a loss of USD532mn; in 2010, it had recorded a profit of USD2.8bn.The loss can be attributed to the sharp decline in freight rates, as a rate war between the major box carriers played out in 2011, forcing Maersk Line's average freight rate down 7.7% y-o-y, to USD2,828 per TEU. This was coupled with the negative impact from spiralling fuel costs, with the bunker price average increasing by 35.4% y-o-y to USD620 per tonne.

Maersk Line's exposure to the Asia-Europe trade route was a key factor in its 2011 loss. The route dominates the company's operations, accounting for 39% (the operator in fact lifted its market share in this route by 1 percentage point over the year, from 38%). While the route recorded solid throughput growth of 16% in 2011, a y-o-y decline in rates of 19% made turning a profit impossible.

Other key areas of growth for Maersk Line, in terms of container volumes, were Africa and Latin America, which recorded throughput increases of 19% and 17% respectively. These regions also increased their role in the carrier's distribution of volumes, with Africa accounting for 16% of the total and Latin America accounting for 14%. Unfortunately, rates also declined on both routes. The three areas in 2011 where rates did not decline were the transatlantic, Oceania and intra-Asia. Intra-Asia in our view, remained Maersk Line's stand-out performer, seeing 5% volume growth. Intra-Asia still only accounted for 6% of Maersk Line's total volume distribution, but with demand increasing and the fact that it has proved itself relatively protected from the rate decline, BMI expected Maersk Line to continue expanding its coverage.

## 2010

Maersk's revenue increased by 30.65% y-o-y to USD26bn in 2010, compared with USD19.9bn in 2009. The increase enabled the carrier to return to the black, with a full-year profit of USD2.6bn, following a loss of USD2.1bn in 2009. The recovery in revenue was driven by the global uptick in both volumes and demand in the container shipping sector. In terms of total volumes carried, Maersk's box levels shipped increased by 5.0%. The major driver of Maersk's recovery, however, was its ability to raise rates. Rates grew 29% y-o-y in 2010; Asia-Europe saw the greatest rise, at 52% y-o-y, followed by the transpacific, where rates increased by 33%.

The trend BMI noted from Maersk's results is that rates increased considerably more than volumes in all but one case. The exception to the rule was intra-Asia, where volumes grew by 37% while rates rose 19%. This

growth in volumes further cemented BMI's view that intra-Asia trade routes hold massive growth potential for the box shipping sector.

The company achieved its recovery in 2010 mainly through rate rises but, like its peers, the line struggled in 2011 to implement planned increases.

We note that it was not simply the uptick in volumes and rates that enabled Maersk to improve its financial position. The firm has continued its strategy of slow-steaming, ensuring a saving on bunker fuel. BMI expected this strategy to continue as demand in the market for express services had not yet materialised.

#### **Latest Activity**

#### 2M Receives FMC Approval

AP Moller-Maersk and Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) received US Federal Maritime
Commission approval for a vessel-sharing pact on October 8, after the majority of commissioners voted not
to seek further information regarding the impact of the alliance on exporters and ports. According to a
statement issued by Maersk, the US approval was the last regulatory approval it needed to form the alliance.
It further stated that the alliance is expected to commence operations in January. Under the pact, the
companies will deploy 185 containerships, which will allow Maersk Line to save USD350mn per year.
According to a joint statement by Maersk and MSC, the alliance would cut costs for shippers and reduce
harmful emissions. However, the China Shippers' Association has voiced concerns stating that the pact is
not suitable for China as Maersk and MSC already hold a large share of the market, Reuters reported in
October.

In September Maersk Line and MSC unveiled service routes under their vessel sharing agreement (VSA), the 2M alliance. Under the VSA, the two companies will operate six Asia-North Europe services, five Asia-Mediterranean loops, four Asia-North America West Coast strings and two via Suez on routes from Asia to the North American East Coast. In addition, Maersk Line plans to make direct calls from Shanghai to the Black Sea and from Japan to Le Havre and Gothenburg. The new routes are expected to lower disruptions by having multiple calls to reduce the impact of slack season blank sailings.

Earlier, at the beginning of September, the FMC commissioner, William Doyle said, according to WSJ, that the proposed 2M alliance was unlikely to secure approval from the US government unless the FMC consults the Chinese regulators. The statement came in view of China's decision to block the previous vessel-sharing agreement, the P3 alliance between Maersk, MSC and CMA CGM, on June 17. Doyle was scheduled to

visit Shanghai in November for bilateral talks with his Chinese counterparts. The 2M alliance is expected to handle nearly 30% of all cargo trade between Asia and Europe and across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

Maersk Line and MSC have entered a vessel sharing agreement on the Asia-Europe, trans-atlantic and trans-pacific routes in July 2014 following the failure of the P3 alliance. Under the new VSA dubbed 2M, a total of 185 vessels having a total capacity of 2.1mn twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) will be deployed on 21 strings. The 10-year VSA is likely to begin in early 2015. Under the VSA Maersk and MSC will contribute nearly 110 and 75 vessels having a capacity of 1.2mn TEUs and 0.9mn TEUs respectively.

#### Maersk To Invest USD15bn Over Five Years

Maersk Line intends to invest USD15bn over a period of five years, mainly in larger container vessels with a capacity of more than 10,000 twenty-foot equivalent units, according to a statement issued by CEO Søren Skou in September 2014. The company expects supply/demand volatility to continue as companies are looking for cost savings through larger ships. The company is of the view that the large vessels will help it in benefiting from the falling freight rates. Skou said, 'In terms of declining freight rates, in our view there is only one strategy that works in this scenario - lowest cost will win. We will continue to have a deflationary mindset.' according to a Seatrade Global report.

#### Tenth And Eleventh 18,000TEU Newbuildings Delivered

Maersk Line took delivery of two more 18,270TEU newbuildings in July and August 2014. *Mayview Maersk* is the tenth and *Merete Maersk* is the eleventh such vessels out of 20 ordered from South Korea's Daewoo shipyard (DSME) in 2011. Both *Mayview Maersk* and *Merete Maersk* will be used on Maersk Line's Asia-Europe AE-10 service, replacing the 15,550TEU *Elly Maersk* and *Edith Maersk*, which will be moved to the Far East to Europe AE-2 loop, according to TransREporter.

#### SeaLand Ready For 2015 Launch

SeaLand, Maersk Line's revived brand will be ready to launch at the beginning of 2015, according to Maersk Line's CEO Søren Skou, JOL.com reports. According to Skou, the carrier has had 'significant success in the intra trades with Seago Line in Europe and MCC in Asia, and now we want to replicate that model in intra-Americas' with SeaLand, which will capture intra-Americas trade and increase liner's market share on the north-south routes. SeaLand's headquarters will be in Florida and its Central American hub will be in Panama City's Balboa district. According to Skou, 250 Maersk Line's staff will be transferred to SeaLand's offices across the region.

## Reshuffling Two Asia-West Africa Services

Maersk Line and CMA CGM-Delmas have changed the port rotations of the ASAF/FEW 6 and WAX 1/ FEW 1, two of their five joint services operating on the Asia-West Africa trade lanes, according to Schednet, as cited by thaishipper.com. The ASAF/FEW 6 will be calling at Xingang and Qingdao in the North of China, the ports previously served by the WAX 1. The two concerned loops are operated by CMA CGM. The new ASAF/FEW 6 rotation from August 9 2014 is Xingang, Qingdao, Shanghai, Guangzhou-Nansha, Shenzhen-Chiwan, Singapore, Tanjung Pelepas, Port Kelang, Walvis Bay, Pointe Noire, Luanda, Cape Town, Port Kelang and back to Xingang. The new service will turn in 13 weeks instead of 12 previously, using twelve 4,300-5,700TEUs and one 6,612TEU vessels.

The new 15-weeks rotation of WAX 1/FEW 1 is Shanghai, Ningbo, Shenzhen-Chiwan, Guangzhou-Nansha, Tanjung Pelepas, Port Kelang, Cape Town, Lagos-Tincan, Douala, Abidjan, Pointe Noire, Colombo, Port Kelang and Shanghai from August 15 2014.

## Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC)

#### Overview

Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC) was founded in 1970 in Geneva, Switzerland. It launched its first service between the Mediterranean and South and East Africa in the mid-1970s. In 2003, it became the second-largest container shipper in the world, and remains in that position.

The carrier operates 200 direct and combined services weekly, calling at 316 ports. It has 452 offices in 155 countries.

#### **SWOT Analysis**

#### Strengths

- MSC is the second-largest container shipper in the world.
- The company has a forward-thinking strategy, with a fleet of 14,000-twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) vessels.
- MSC is not averse to chartering, which has allowed it to expand its fleet.
- The line is managing its capacity and exposure during volatility in the container shipping sector via linkups with other carriers and an alliance with CMA CGM.
- The company is increasing its exposure to the US, operating its largest vessels on the transpacific trade route.

#### Weaknesses

• With such a large fleet, MSC is constantly running the risk of overcapacity, which could be a drain on resources if business slows. It has 49 vessels on order, at a time when overcapacity remains such a major issue for container lines.

## **Opportunities**

- The shipping sector has proved lucrative in the past two decades, with trade volumes growing year-on-year since 1982. Although the downturn affected the company, the medium- to long-term opportunity for trade growth is ever present, and MSC is well positioned to capture these volumes.
- The company is seeking greater exposure to emerging trade routes, specifically in South America, which offer new growth opportunities.

#### Threats

- MSC is heavily exposed to Europe, not only on its Asia-Europe routes, but also its intra-Europe portfolio. The slow growth outlook in the region will be a threat to demand, and growth in volumes on these routes is likely to remain sluggish.
- MSC's desire to become number one could be hampered by Maersk Line, which is taking delivery of its 18,000TEU fleet.
- Overcapacity is set to remain a major threat for lines in the short term.

#### Strategy

MSC continues to snap at Maersk Line's heels, with a global market share of 13.5% compared with Maersk's 15.1%, according to AXS Alphaliner. BMI believes that MSC will continue to battle for the top position.

By some measures, it has overtaken Maersk Line to claim top position, with Containerisation International reporting in February 2011 that it had overtaken the Danish carrier in terms of capacity. This measurement takes into consideration only Maersk Line and not the whole Maersk Group, which includes Safmarine and MCC Transport. Taking the group as a whole into account, Maersk Line still holds the top position.

In December 2011, the US-based Journal of Commerce reported that, based on US import and export trade, MSC had replaced Maersk Line as the top container line serving the US in the first nine months of 2011, with MSC's operations almost balanced between imports and exports.

BMI highlights that MSC operates the largest vessels on the transpacific route. The company now utilises vessels with capacities of between 11,600TEUs and 14,000TEUs on the trade route and in October 2011 docked its largest box ship ever into the port of Long Beach, with the MSC Beatrice, a 14,000TEU capacity vessel, calling there.

#### **Routes**

As the rates on both the Asia-Europe and the transpacific routes remain volatile, container lines are still battling the threat of overcapacity and are linking up to better manage the problem. MSC has formed an alliance with France's CMA CGM on the trade routes of Asia-Europe, Asia-Southern Africa and South America. The alliance will maintain considerable influence on the market share of lines on the Asia-Europe route: the two carriers are operating a four-route service, including 44 ships with capacities of over

11,000TEUs. The effect of the alliance on this route was immediately felt, with the members of the Grand Alliance and New World Alliance announcing at the end of 2011 that they would join together to form a mega alliance of six operators, called the G6 Alliance.

MSC is heavily exposed to the 'big money' routes, particularly the transpacific, with the line operating five services from Asia to US West Coast ports. The line also caters to the US East Coast market with an all-water service.

In September 2014 MSC and Maersk Line unveiled service routes under their major VSA dubbed 2M. The two companies plan to operate six Asia-North Europe services, five Asia-Mediterranean loops, four Asia-North America West Coast strings and two via Suez from Asia to the North American East Coast from the beginning of 2015.

MSC also caters for intra-Asia trade, with its New Shogun service linking China and Japan and its TongKing Service connecting China with Vietnam. Some of the line's other services serve a number of countries in Asia before linking elsewhere in the world. The Cheetah Service links Chinese ports with the Taiwanese port of Kaohsiung, before travelling on to Africa. In April 2014, it launched Africa Express, a dedicated weekly service between Asia and West Africa, with cargoes being shipped directly to West Africa with an improved transit time to Tin Can-Lagos of 28 days from Chiwan and 23 days from Singapore. From August 2014 calls at China's Shanghai and Ningbo and, from the end of October, at Lome, Togo were added to Africa Express, with the new rotation being Shanghai, Ningbo, Guangzhou-Nansha, Shenzhen-Chiwan, Singapore, Port Louis, Lagos-Tincan, Lome, San Pedro, Abidjan, Ngqura (aka Coega), Singapore and Shanghai.

BMI believes that there is room for expansion in MSC's intra-Asia portfolio, with the potential for more intra-Asia specific routes either operated solely or in partnership. In comparison with its peers, MSC has only a small exposure to the intra-Asia market, which is set to be a major growth area for box carriers in the medium term.

#### **Fleet**

MSC has the second-largest container fleet in the world, operating 495 vessels with a total capacity of 2.5mn TEUs. The fleet's dynamics are weighted toward the charter market, with chartered-in ships accounting for 58.1% of the total.

Iran Shipping Report Q1 2015

It has an owned fleet of 193 vessels with a capacity of 1.06mn TEUs, while its chartered fleet of 310vessels

has a combined capacity of 1.47mn TEUs.

An exact breakdown of MSC's fleet is unavailable, but the line is a member of the ultra-large container ship

club, with a fleet of 14,000TEU vessels. The company stated in December 2011 that carriers must deploy

the largest vessels on the Asia-Europe trade lane in order to minimise losses. Vice-president Diego Aponte

said at the time that he expected the Asia-Europe trade route to remain unprofitable until 2013.

MSC is preparing to take on more box ship tonnage, both owned and chartered. The company's order book

currently stands at 49 vessels with a total capacity of 584,940TEUs.

While the carrier operates 14,000TEU vessels, it does not appear prepared at the moment to order larger

ships. In an interview with Lloyd's List, MSC's founder and chairman Gianluigi Aponte stated that the

company had no intention of following Maersk Line's lead and ordering 18,000TEU vessels. Aponte said

that he was 'only interested in ships up to 14,000 TEUs'. It should be noted, however, that Aponte initially

denied interest in ordering 14,000TEU vessels, yet his company has since done so. BMI will therefore not

completely rule out the development of vessels larger than 14,000TEUs by MSC in the future, especially

with reports linking MSC with an order for 19,000TEU vessels appearing in 2014.

**Financial Results** 

2013

Not available. Quantity of TEUs carried was 13.7mn.

2012

Not available. Quantity of TEUs carried was 13.2mn.

2011

Not available. Quantity of TEUs carried was 13.1mn.

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#### 2010

MSC does not publish its financial results. However, its operating fleet and the amount of cargo carried increased in 2010. In that year, the line operated 432 vessels - a y-o-y increase of 14.3% from the 387 ships operated in 2009 and above the company's pre-downturn fleet of 410 vessels. Despite the downturn in 2009, the fleet's capacity continued growing, from 1.4mn TEUs in 2008 to 1.47mn TEUs in 2009 and 1.82mn TEUs in 2010.

However, the real indicator of improvement in MSC's operations is the volume of containers carried. This grew by 17.6% y-o-y to reach 12.1mn TEUs in 2010, following a y-o-y decline of 10.5% in 2009. In 2010, levels reached and surpassed the pre-downturn handling level of 11.5mn TEUs, indicating that MSC had recovered from the downturn. Coupled with rate increases during the year, which were implemented across the board, this meant that the company was in the black in 2010.

#### **Latest Activity**

#### FMC Gives Green Light To 2M

MSC and AP Moller-Maersk received US Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) approval for a vessel-sharing pact on October 8, after the majority of commissioners voted not to seek further information regarding the impact of the alliance on exporters and ports. MSC issued a statement saying it is 'delighted to announce' that following the approval its 2M vessel -sharing agreement (VSA) with Maersk Line 'is to proceed as planned'. According to Diego Aponte, MSC's President and CEO the carrier's clients will benefit from service enhancements which 2M will deliver from the beginning of 2015.

Under the pact, the companies will deploy 185 containerships, which will allow Maersk Line to save USD350mn per year. According to a joint statement by Maersk and MSC, the alliance would cut costs for shippers and reduce harmful emissions. However, the China Shippers' Association has voiced concerns stating that the pact is not suitable for China as Maersk and MSC already hold a large share of the market, Reuters reported in October.

In September MSC and Maersk Line unveiled service routes under their VSA. The two companies will operate six Asia-North Europe services, five Asia-Mediterranean loops, four Asia-North America West Coast strings and two via Suez from Asia to the North American East Coast. The 2M alliance is expected to handle nearly 30% of all cargo trade between Asia and Europe and across the Atlantic and Pacific oceans.

MSC and Maersk Line have entered a vessel sharing agreement on the Asia-Europe, transatlantic and transpacific routes in July 2014 following the failure of the P3 alliance. Under the VSA dubbed 2M, a total of 185 vessels having a total capacity of 2.1mn twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) will be deployed on 21 strings. The 10-year VSA is likely to begin in early 2015. MSC and Maersk will contribute nearly 75 and 110 vessels having a capacity of 0.9mn TEUs and 1.2mn TEUs respectively.

#### MSC To Overtake Maersk By 2016

MSC is expected to overtake Maersk Line as the world's largest ocean container carrier in terms of deployed capacity by 2016, according to Alphaliner. MSC has embarked on a massive expansion strategy to increase capacity, compared with Maersk Line, which has not placed any newbuilding orders in the last three years. MSC was recently linked to an order for 19,000 twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) ships placed by China's Bank of Communications Financial Leasing and a maiden order of three 19,200TEU vessels by Scorpio. These orders, combined with 34 new Neo-Panamax ships of 8,800-9,400TEUs due for delivery in 2015-2016, are likely to increase MSC's capacity from 2.5mn TEUs to 3mn TEUs by the end of 2016, Seatrade Global reports.

#### MSC Receives 15,908TEU Vessel

MSC has received a new vessel, the MSC London, in July 2014. The vessel is the first of six 15,908 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs) ships due to be constructed at STX Shippard on charter from Zodiac Maritime and Eastern Pacific Shipping. The vessel will join the Asia-Eastern Mediterranean Tiger service, according to TransREporter.

#### Shanghai And Ningbo Get Direct Calls On Africa Express From Asia

MSC introduced port calls in China's Shanghai and Ningbo on its weekly Asia to Africa (Africa Express) service from August 2014. The rotation now takes 11 weeks instead of 10 previously, with one extra vessel added. The service now deploys eleven 4,000-4,250TEU vessels on the following port rotation: Shanghai, Ningbo, Guangzhou-Nansha, Shenzhen-Chiwan, Singapore, Port Louis, Lagos-Tincan, San Pedro, Abidjan, Ngqura (aka Coega), Singapore and back to Shanghai. According to Alphaliner report, as cited by Schednet, prior to their addition to Africa Express, Shanghai and Ningbo were connected to it via transhipment at Chiwan and Singapore, with connections to the intra-Asia legs of MSC's Far East-Europe loops.

Africa Express, a dedicated service between Asia and West Africa, was launched in April 2014. The cargoes previously transhipped via the Mediterranean started being shipped directly to West Africa with an improved transit time to Tin Can-Lagos of 28 days from Chiwan and 23 days from Singapore.

## Montevideo Call Added On Ipanema Service

MSC and Hamburg Sud have added a call at Montevideo to their joint Far East-South Africa-ECSA Ipanema service, with the new rotation being Shanghai, Ningbo, Chiwan, Singapore, Durban, Santos, Paranagua, Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Navegantes, Santos, Ngqura, Durban, Colombo, Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai, according to Alphaliner data sourced from Schednet. The 13-weeks service uses thirteen 6,500-9,400TEU vessels.

## **CMA CGM**

#### Overview

CMA CGM is the world's third-largest shipping line. Compagnie Générale Maritime (CGM) was formed in 1977 by the merger of Messageries Maritimes (MessMar) and Compagnie Générale Transatlantique (Transat). Compagnie Maritime d'Affrètement (CMA) was founded the following year.

In 1996 CMA CGM was privatised and the following year made its first acquisition, Australian National Lines (ANL). This was followed by a spree of acquisitions, beginning with UK-based MacAndrews in 2002. In 2006 CMA CGM purchased Delmas, an African shipping line previously owned by Groupe Bolloré. The acquisition propelled CMA CGM to third place in the ranking of the world's largest container shipping lines. Strong growth enabled it to make three purchases in 2007, with the acquisition of Taiwan-based Cheng Lie Navigation, Moroccan line COMANAV and US-based US Lines.

Turkey's Yildirim Group has a 24% stake (which it is seeking to increase to 30%) in CMA CGM and has voting rights, but the Saadé family remains in charge, with a majority of both shares and voting rights. Fonds Stratégique d'Investissement (FSI) holds a 6% stake in the company following its USD150mn equity injection in 2013.

The group has operations in container shipping, with a focus on reefer cargo. It also operates in the tourist industry through subsidiary Croisières et Tourisme. CMA CGM Logistics boasts 56 branches in Asia, Europe, the Middle East, North and South America and Africa and owns TCX Multimodal Logistics - a bonded warehouse company that operates in many French ports. CMA CGM's multimodal subsidiaries include French River Shuttle Containers; ocean freight forwarder LTI France (Land Transportation International); as well as CMA Rail (Rail Link Europe) and Progeco - the repair arm of CMA CGM's container business. In 2012 CMA CGM Group combined five of its multi-modal subsidiaries (Rail Link Europe, River Shuttle Containers, Land Transportation International, Progeco and TCX) into one entity - tri-modal operator Greenmodal Transport. Terminal Link is the group's terminal operating business.

#### **SWOT Analysis**

#### Strengths

- The group has the third-largest container fleet in the world.
- CMA CGM has a number of diversified subsidiaries, catering for different markets across the globe.
- Terminal Link supports the growth of the shipping division and the group's subsidiaries.
- Its multimodal divisions also bolster growth, providing clients with an integrated 'door-to-door' service.
- The line is managing its capacity and exposure during volatility in the container shipping sector via link-ups with other carriers and an alliance with Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC).
- The company was back in the black in 2012 and 2013.

#### Weaknesses

- With such a large fleet, the risk of overcapacity is ever present.
- The firm is not as diverse as competitors such as Maersk, COSCO and China Shipping, which also operate in the bulk and tanker sectors.

#### **Opportunities**

- The three-pronged acquisition of US Lines, COMANAV and Cheng Lie Navigation offers the opportunity to capture traffic volumes to and from three different regional markets.
- The partnership with Yildirim Group will enable the company to return to a strategy of growth rather than being preoccupied with the threat of insolvency.
- CMA CGM increasing its exposure to Russia, which BMI believes will be a high-growth market.
- Increasing its exposure to Africa, a high-growth market, and expanding its services.
- Being a member of the Ocean Three alliance will ensure that CMA CGM retains its role within the container shipping sector.

#### **Threats**

- The company must ensure it does not place the importance of its market share above recovery.
- Overcapacity and sluggish demand are still major issues facing the box shipping sector.
- Debt restructuring is leading to less diversity in the company's operations portfolio, with the group selling stakes in one of its major terminals and its cruise ship company.

#### **Strategy**

CMA CGM is the third-largest global container shipping company, with an 8.7% market share, according to AXS Alphaliner. This puts it considerably behind second-placed MSC with its 13.5% market share, but significantly ahead of fourth-place Evergreen, on 5.1%.

CMA CGM managed to ride out the 2009 downturn, despite a period where it looked likely that the French government would be required to bail it out. The shipping line was determined to remain a family concern. It found an investor in Yildirim Group, which agreed to invest USD500mn and take a 20% stake in the shipping line. This has since been increased to 24%, but left the Saadé family in charge, with a majority of both shares and voting rights. However, Yildirim is making its presence felt, blocking a planned new build strategy. Yildirim is seeking to increase its stake in CMA CGM from 24% to 30%.

Debt restructuring is affecting CMA CGM's diversity of operations, with the company selling its stake in the Marsaxlokk Malta Freeport terminal and its cruise ship company Compagnie du Ponant.

#### **Routes**

As rates on the Asia-Europe and transpacific routes remain volatile, container lines are still battling the threat of overcapacity. Lines are starting to link up in a bid to manage the problem. CMA CGM has formed an alliance with MSC on the Asia-Europe, Asia-Southern Africa and South America routes. The alliance will continue to considerably affect the market share of lines on the Asia-Europe route, with the two carriers set to operate a four-route service and deploy 44 ships with capacities of more than 11,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). The impact of the alliance on the route is already being felt, with the members of the Grand Alliance and New World Alliance announcing at the end of 2011 that they would join together to form a mega alliance of six operators, called the G6 Alliance.

In September 2014, CMA CGM formed the Ocean Three alliance with China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) and United Arab Shipping Company (UASC), which encased vessel sharing agreements, slot exchange agreements and slot charter agreements on their Asia-Europe, Asia-Mediterranean, Transpacific and Asia-US East Coast maritime trades. The alliance was planned to begin operations from the end of 2014, subject to the approval by the US Federal Maritime Commission.

CMA CGM is a major player in Asia-Europe trade, boasting a service network of eight routes. It is exposed to the transpacific with a route network of ten services and is heavily involved in intra-Asia trade. CMA CGM offers 19 intra-Asia trade routes. These are, however, feeder services, and it is the company's Asian

subsidiary CNC Line that operates direct intra-Asia services. BMI expects CMA CGM to continue its strategy of developing its exposure to intra-Asia trade, as the region is deemed to offer major box shipping growth potential.

The group itself announced that for 2014 it is 'especially focusing on fast growing regions with the launch of new services and the development of port infrastructure', underlining that this 'is notably the case in Africa with the strengthening of its lines, the development of overland corridors and the opening of new agencies and logistical terminals'.

#### Fleet

Like its peers, CMA CGM's fleet is getting bigger, not only in terms of vessel numbers but also in terms of capacity. It operates a fleet of 13,000TEU vessels, with 30 vessels of 11,000TEU-plus capacity. The company has also welcomed three 16,000TEU ships to its fleet, with the vessels operating on the Asia-Europe trade route from the end of 2012 and from April and May 2013.

The company has 38 vessels on its order book with a total capacity of 362,635TEUs, according to AXS Alphaliner.

The company has concentrated on developing its fleet via chartering in tonnage and is expected to continue this strategy. Chartered tonnage accounts for 66.4% of CMA CGM's total TEU capacity. This offers the company considerable flexibility. During periods of decline in volumes, it can return chartered vessels when the charter period has finished, reducing the size of its fleet and operating costs.

#### **Financial Results**

### Q214

CMA CGM posted a y-o-y increase of 3.7% in consolidated revenue in the second quarter of 2014, from USD4,050mn in Q213 to USD4,200mn. The carrier's volumes were up 8.0% to 3.1mn TEUs in Q214, compared to 2.9mn TEUs in Q213, with the average per TEU falling by 3.9% over the period.

CMA CGM attributed growth in volumes mainly to 'the development of the Group's Asia-Europe and Africa lines, and of the Asia-Pacific lines of its subsidiary ANL, reflecting CMA CGM's enhanced services portfolio in these regions'.

Consolidated net profit for the period amounted to USD94mn in Q214, below the USD268mn achieved in the corresponding period of 2013. The Q213 result, however, included non-recurring elements such as USD248mn brought by the sale of the 49% stake in port terminal operations subsidiary Terminal Link.

### Q114

CMA CGM's consolidated revenue was up 2.7% y-o-y in the first quarter of 2014, from USD3,835.9mn in Q113 to USD3,940.9mn, mainly due to a 5.8% (or 154,400TEU) increase in volumes to 2.802mn TEUs in Q114 and despite average revenue per TEU falling by 2.9% to USD1,407 per TEU. Over the same period market freight rates as measured by the average SCFI compound have declined by 8.6%, according to the company.

The 154,400TEU increase in volumes was primarily attributable to a 76,000TEU (5.1%) increase in volumes on CMA CGM's main East West lines, to a 2,600TEU (3.7%) increase on main North South lines, and to a 52,000TEU (12.0%) increase by CMA CGM's subsidiaries, with the most of the increase brought in by ANL, the subsidiary specialising on intra-Asia trade.

Profit for the period was up 0.68% y-o-y from USD102.4mn to USD103.1mn.

#### 2013

CMA CGM's consolidated revenue decreased by 0.1% y-o-y in 2013, from USD15,923.2mn in 2012 to USD15,901.5mn, mainly due to a 2.2% decrease in other activities revenues reflecting deconsolidation of CMA CGM's terminal activities subsidiary Terminal Link combined with a 0.03% increase in container shipping revenue, which amounted to USD14,751.9mn, compared to USD14,748.1mn in the previous year.

Volumes were up 7.5% y-o-y from 10.603mn TEUs in 2012 to 11.397mn TEUs in 2013. Average shipping revenue per TEU (shipping revenue divided by total carried TEU volumes) decreased 6.9% or USD96 per TEU from USD1,391 per TEU in 2012 to USD1,294 per TEU in 2013.

Consolidated net profit was up 22.8% y-o-y to USD408mn, compared to USD332mn a year ago, in part as a result of the sale of 49% of Terminal Link in June.

### Q313& 9M13

CMA CGM's consolidated quarterly revenue was down 2.4% y-o-y from USD4.2bn to USD4.1bn in Q313. Net profit attributable to shareholders decreased significantly - from USD363mn to USD70mn. The year-to-date figures, however, improved, with a 0.3% y-o-y increase in revenue - from USD11.9bn to USD12.0bn - and a 52.6% growth in net profit - from USD284mn to USD434mn.

Container volumes were up 11.1% y-o-y to 3.0mn TEUs in Q313, the year-to-date box volumes increased by 6.3% from 8.0mn TEUs in January-September 2012 to 8.5mn TEUs.

### Q213 & H113

CMA CGM's consolidated revenue increased by 1.7% y-o-y to USD7.9bn in the first half of 2013, compared with USD7.8bn in H112, despite Q213 revenue at USD4.0bn being 2.4% below the USD4.1bn achieved in Q212. The group's net profit was at USD364mn in H113, compared to a net loss of USD79mn in H112. Most of the profit (USD268mn, +58.6% y-o-y) was achieved in Q213 and included USD249mn related to the reorganisation of port operations, including the disposal of Terminal Link.

CMA CGM's container volumes were up 6.9% y-o-y to 2.9mn TEUs in Q212; however, the average freight rate was down 8.6% over the period. H113 box volumes were up 4.9% from 5.3mn TEUs in H112 to 5.6mn TEUs.

CMA CGM once again reported a significant reduction of its net debt - by USD385bn - to USD3.8bn at June 30, following USD1.1bn and USD0.4bn contractions over two previous quarters.

### Q113

CMA CGM reported improved consolidated financial results for the first quarter of 2013. The group posted a net profit of USD102mn in Q113, compared to a net loss of USD240mn in the corresponding quarter of 2012. CMA CGM's container volumes were up 3.0% y-o-y, from 2.6mn TEUs in Q112 to 2.7mn TEUs in Q113, resulting in a 6.0% growth in consolidated revenue, from USD3.6bn to USD3.8bn, which was also affected by a 3.0% increase in freight rates.

CMA CGM also reported a significant reduction of its net debt to USD4.2bn at March 31 2013, which is USD1.1bn less than, at the end of Q112 and USD0.4bn less than at December 31 2012.

#### 2012

CMA CGM's consolidated revenue increased by 7.0% y-o-y in 2012, from USD 14.9bn in 2011 to USD15.9bn, driven by container volume growth of 6.0%, from 10mn TEUs in 2011 to 10.6mn TEUs in 2012. The company said it achieved USD800mn of savings over the year - well above target. It posted a consolidated net profit of USD361mn in 2012, compared to a net loss of USD5mn a year before.

The company managed to reduce bunker costs per TEU by 12.0% and charter expenses by USD200mn. In 2013 it expects a similar level of profitability, helping it to cut its net debt by USD1.1bn to USD3.5bn.

A company press release mentions the strengthening of CMA CGM's balance sheet thanks to the sale of 49% of Terminal Link for EUR400mn, the closing of USD100mn equity injection from Yildirim, the signing of USD150mn equity injection from Fonds Stratégique d'Investissement (FSI) and the closing of the agreement with company's banks regarding its debt restructuring.

#### Q312 & 9M12

CMA CGM reported improved earnings for Q312. This left it on course for a full-year profit after a hugely challenging four years for the global container sector. However, while this provides some much-needed respite and underscores the success of its cost-cutting programme, ongoing issues of overcapacity and a weak global growth outlook do not give cause for much optimism.

CMA CGM posted a net profit of USD371mn in Q312, bringing 9M12 profit to USD310mn, compared to just USD13.2mn in the first nine months of 2011. An improved Q3 was attributed to internal cost-reduction measures, as well as some rates relief and the benefits of reduced fuel costs. The ongoing challenges of overcapacity and weak global growth saw the company state that Q4 would be weaker. Yet it remained on track to post a full-year net profit.

Reasons for optimism for CMA CGM come in the form of the successful cost-control measures. In the first nine months of the year it realised savings of USD550mn, equivalent to a 5% y-o-y reduction in operating costs and well ahead of the target of USD400mn in savings for the full year. Planned asset sales, including the disposal of a 49% stake in terminal operator Terminal Link and the sale and leaseback of some of its self-owned vessels, should help keep operating costs under control moving into 2013. Furthermore, planned investments from FSI (USD150mn) and Yildirim (USD100mn) should help alleviate operating pressures. Finally, perhaps most importantly and related to the aforementioned planned capital injections, CMA CGM reached a restructuring deal with its lenders to help manage its 2013 debt obligations.

While providing respite and putting the company on a firmer footing, all this did not prevent CMA CGM from having another challenging year in 2013. The external operating environment was simply too difficult. On the supply side, issues of overcapacity only became greater, and indeed CMA CGM contributed to this with its own ordering strategy. On the demand side, a weak outlook for global economic growth acted as a further headwind.

BMI estimates global real GDP growth of 2.9% in 2013, revised down from a previous forecast of 3.0%. While high frequency indicators suggest the outlook for global growth is weak rather than recessionary, a Chinese hard landing, eurozone debt woes, the US fiscal cliff, the ever more marginal gains to be realised from expansionary monetary policy and the increasing difficulty with which governments can pursue expansionary fiscal policy - all mean this outlook remains precarious.

#### Q212 & H112

In Q212 CMA CGM bounced back into the black with a USD178mn net profit. Revenue increased by 12% to USD4.15bn. In H112 CMA CGM made a saving of USD294mn, putting it on course to realise its 2012 cost-cutting plan of USD400mn.

#### Q112

Although the carrier's volumes increased by 13.4% y-o-y to 2.6mn TEU and revenues grew by 2.6% to USD3.6bn, it posted a loss of USD248mn, with the relatively high bunker fuel price being blamed.

#### 2011

CMA CGM reported a USD30mn loss in 2011, but this was considerably lower than that being posted by the company's peers. The loss was despite a 4.0% increase in revenue to USD14.87bn and 11.0% growth in container volumes carried by the liner to 10mn TEUs. The loss was attributed to overcapacity in the market, which forced rates down, and a rise in oil prices, which saw the bunker fuel price rise 34% y-o-y.

CMA CGM planned to get back into the black in 2012 via a cost-saving strategy, with USD400mn in savings planned. In terms of expansion, the carrier planned to increase its coverage of Russia, India, Latin America and Africa, as well as expand its reefer coverage.

#### 2010

CMA CGM's revenue increased by 36% in 2010 to USD14.3bn, from USD10.5bn in 2009. This enabled the line to post a USD1.6bn profit following a loss of USD1.4bn in 2009. The recovery in revenue was driven by the global uptick in both volumes and demand for the container shipping sector. In terms of total volumes carried, CMA CGM's box levels shipped increased by 14.7%. The company stated that 'Asia-Europe and intra-Asia lines enjoyed record business... Asia-US lines returned to pre-recession levels.'

BMI believes the volume uptick in 2010 was just part of the story. Volumes were up both y-o-y and on 2008 levels (by 4.4%). We believe rate increases also played a massive role.

### **Latest Activity**

### O3 Alliance Key For CMA CGM Competitiveness

The Ocean Three Alliance will allow CMA CGM to remain competitive in the container shipping sector.

The new vessel-sharing agreement announced in September 2014 - the Ocean Three Alliance (O3) - between CMA CGM, United Arab shipping Co. (UASC), and China Shipping Container Lines will ensure CMA CGM remains competitive in the face of a tough container shipping market. The formation marks the fourth major east-west alliance involving three major carriers. It joins the G6 and CKYH-E alliances and the proposed 2M Alliance of Maersk Line and Mediterranean Shipping Co. (MSC), an alliance that left CMA CGM to fend for itself following the June 2014 rejection by China of the P3 Network Agreement involving Maersk Line, MSC and CMA CGM.

CMA CGM is the world's third-largest carrier behind Maersk and MSC, and as such, joining forces with China Shipping (seventh) and UASC (19th) is a necessary move for the company as it seeks to compete with the combined forces of the world's biggest container lines.

The O3 Alliance is also a strategic move for the French line as the group will operate some of the world's biggest container vessels on the major east-west liner trade routes. UASC has six 18,800 twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) ships on order and China Shipping is awaiting delivery of five 19,000TEU units, which will be the largest container vessels afloat. CMA CGM has six 17,700 to 17,800TEU units on order, scheduled for delivery in 2015.

The alliance will bring greater economies of scale for the company via a combination of vessel-sharing agreements, slot exchange deals and slot charter arrangements. Lower per-container costs are the holy grail of the container shipping sector, especially in the present climate of depressed shipping rates. Container shipping rates have been particularly volatile in recent years on the back of a faltering economy and chronic overcapacity. Container prices on the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index (SCFI) US West Coast Route, a measure of transpacific rates, were down 8.9% for the year-to-date (YTD) (January 1 to September 5) compared to the same period in 2013. On the other hand, rates on the SCFI Europe-Asia Route, for ships beginning at the Northern European ports of Hamburg, Antwerp, Felixstowe or Le Havre, were up 24.2% YTD compared to the same period in 2013 - illustrating demand on this route, which signals bigger growth opportunities for ships with greater capacity.

The O3 Alliance will boost capacity for the three companies on their Asia-Europe, Asia-Mediterranean, Transpacific and US East Coast routes, which is a necessary step considering that other new alliances are combining their capacity on these routes. In light of this, the move by CMA CGM is part reactionary but is also in line with the company's growth strategy, with the firm having already made significant investment in extending the capacity of its fleet. The final hurdle for the O3 Alliance will be gaining approval from the US Federal Maritime Commission, though with the doomed P3 Alliance gaining approval in early 2014, the O3 Alliance, with its smaller combined market share, should not face significant barriers.

### New Transhipment Hub In Réunion To Boost Africa Exposure

CMA CGM will increase its exposure in the growing container shipping market of Africa with plans for a new transhipment hub in the Indian Ocean Island of Réunion. The company presently operates the largest capacity fleet on the Africa West Coast, and with increased vessel capacity on the Africa East Coast will become the leading operator on the continent in terms of capacity. The Réunion expansion will aid CMA CGM's full Africa coverage strategy.

In August 2014 CMA CGM announced plans to make the port of Réunion the CMA CGM Group transhipment hub in the Indian Ocean. The project will take 12-18 months to develop and, when complete, will double capacity at the port. BMI is optimistic about the plan due to the level of support that exists for the port's expansion. French President Francois Hollande was present at the announcement ceremony and the French Development Agency is financially committed to the project with a USD14.5mn financing agreement with the Réunion Chamber of Commerce & Industry, signed in April 2012.

Our optimism for the project's timely completion is further supported by the existing relationship that CMA CGM has with the country with its vessel calls at the port of Réunion. The expansion project will boost

capacity to allow the port to cater to larger vessels (6,000 to 8,000TEUs) compared with the 4,000TEU vessel capacity at present, offering greater economies of scale and boosting CMA CGM's exposure on the Africa East Coast. The announcement is also in line with the company's wider strategy to increase its presence in existing markets on the continent and to build exposure to include all African markets.

The expansion of the port of Réunion into a transhipment hub is a major coup for CMA CGM as it will mean that the company will become the leading operator, container capacity wise, in Africa. The company already operates the largest ships on the Africa West Coast, with a fleet of 5,700 TEU vessels, but lags behind Maersk on the Africa East Coast, with Maersk operating 4,400TEU ships. The development also means that the overall capacity of the ships CMA CGM will dock at the port of Reunion will be greater than that of Maersk's January 2014 addition of two 4,496TEU vessels to its Horn of Africa (HoA) route, thereby further boosting its regional exposure.

CMA CGM's plans for Réunion and its wider expansion strategy for Africa are understandable, as the African market is the fastest growing in the world and as such provides the strongest growth opportunities for container shipping lines. BMI forecasts average annual real GDP growth of 5.1% for Africa over the medium term (2014-2018). The Asia Pacific market is the second strongest growth market globally, with real GDP forecast to grow by an annual average of 4.6% over the same period.

The planned port expansion at Réunion is the latest example of CMA CGM's commitment to increasing its Africa market share. The company, through its dedicated African subsidiary Delmas is building its Africa-focused expertise and services on both coasts. For example, Delmas has recently invested heavily on its West Coast of Africa operations with the launch of a fleet of twelve 5,700TEU capacity container ships on its Asia to Africa route. The company's new facility at the port of Réunion will see the company well positioned to dominate, capacity-wise, on both African coasts.

#### Swahili Service Upgraded With A Nhava Sheva Call

CMA CGM added a new call at Nhava Sheva NSCIT Terminal on its Swahili service between Africa and India from October 8 2014. The new Swahili port rotation is as follows: Nhava Sheva - Jebel Ali - Khor Fakkan - Mombasa - Dar Es Salaam - Zanzibar - Nacala - Nhava Sheva. The service deploys seven 2,800TEU vessels.

#### Port Rotation For Joint Service Between North East Asia, Australia And New Zealand Unveiled

CMA CGM has unveiled a new port rotation for a joint service between North East Asia, Australia and New Zealand with China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL), Orient Overseas Container Lines (OOCL) and Pacific International Lines (PIL). The weekly service will follow a port rotation of: Shanghai - Ningbo - Chiwan - Kaohsiung - Brisbane - Auckland - Port Chalmers - Lyttelton - Napier - Tauranga - Hong Kong - Shekou - Keelung and back to Shanghai. The new port rotation is to be implemented from early November, according to a statement issued by CMA CGM. Under the service, seven vessels with a capacity of 4,250 twenty-foot equivalent units each will be deployed, which will include three from CMA CGM, two from OOCL and one vessel each from CSCL and PIL.

### Miami Added To Amerigo Service

CMA CGM enhanced its Amerigo service from October 2014, adding a new weekly call in Miami, Florida. The new Amerigo service uses six CMA CGM-operated vessels and turns in 42 days, covering the following ports: Malta, Livorno, Genoa, Fos-sur-mer, Barcelona, Valencia (WB), New York, Norfolk, Savannah, Miami, Tangiers, Valencia (EB) and Malta.

# **Evergreen Line**

#### Overview

Evergreen Line is the name and global brand under which five shipping companies operate. The brand was established in May 2007 and encompasses Evergreen Marine (Taiwan), Italia Marittima (Italy), Evergreen Marine (Hong Kong) and Evergreen Marine (UK). A fifth carrier, Evergreen Marine (Singapore), signed a joint service agreement in May 2009.

Evergreen Line's main routes focus on the delivery of goods from Asia, particularly Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, South Korea and Japan. It operates to and from the US East and West Coasts, South America, Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East and Africa. It also provides a container service between the east coast of South America and the East Coast of the US, as well as a service linking Panama with the US West Coast. The carrier provides regular feeder services in the Caribbean, the Mediterranean and around the Indian subcontinent.

Evergreen is engaged in the port operating sector, with terminals including the Taichung Container Terminal and the Kaohsiung Container Terminal in Taiwan, the Colon Container Terminal in Panama, and the Taranto Container Terminal in southern Italy, in which Hutchison Port Holdings also has a stake.

### **SWOT Analysis**

# Strengths

- Evergreen operates one of the most globalised route networks, with strong coverage of major Latin American and Middle Eastern ports in addition to its core Asian, US and European services.
- Its route-sharing agreements allow it to reduce capacity while still meeting client demands.
- Highly exposed to the intra-Asia trade route, which is widely considered a major growth market.
- The CKYH Alliance (also known as the Green Alliance), made up of COSCON, 'K' Line, Yang Ming and Hanjin Shipping, has formed a partnership with Evergreen Line, allowing the line to better compete with other alliances, as well as market leader Maersk.
- Membership of the CKYHE Alliance (CKYH and Evergreen Line) makes the line more competitive on the trade routes between Asia and Europe, including the Mediterranean.
- Has increased its routes through alliances, despite the difficult operating environment.

#### Weaknesses

- With a large container fleet and little diversification into other sectors, the risk of overcapacity is everpresent. This threat is especially relevant as the company has a large newbuild fleet currently on order, at 14 ships.
- Flagship services are focused on Asia, so a shift in the dynamics of this region could make Evergreen vulnerable.
- Evergreen Marine's (Evergreen Marine Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd. and its subsidiaries') consolidated net loss increased almost ten-fold in 2013, reaching TWD2.05bn.

### **Opportunities**

- Seeking safety in numbers, Evergreen has joined up with the CKYH Alliance on several routes.
- The company is currently conducting the 'rejuvenation' of its fleet, which will give it a younger and more modern fleet and will optimise unit costs.
- Ordered newbuilds at the bottom of the market, so has been able to expand more cheaply than its peers.
- Well placed to take advantage of the growth in cargo traffic brought about by the opening of direct routes between China and Taiwan.
- Is expanding its emerging trade route coverage, with new services connecting Asia and Africa.

#### **Threats**

 While the company has built up intra-Asian history and expertise, the region's growth potential is luring new players, increasing the competition Evergreen will face.

### Strategy

Evergreen Line is continuing to claw its way back up the ranks, and is now fourth in terms of market share. According to AXS Alphaliner, it has an overall capacity of 948,869 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), 133,799TEUs ahead of fifth-placed COSCON. The third-largest container shipping company, CMA GGM, has nearly double the capacity of Evergreen, meaning its climb up the table has likely ended.

#### Routes

Evergreen Line boasts a strong presence on intra-Asia trade routes, and continues to launch new routes. The latest service to be included in its intra-Asia portfolio is its joint one with Mariana Express SEM service linking South China and East Malaysia with a port rotation of Shekou - Hong Kong - Kota Kinabalu

(Malaysia) - Muara (Brunei) - Bintulu (Malaysia) - Shekou. The high growth potential of intra-Asia routes has seen a number of lines expand into this area. BMI believes Evergreen Line is positioned better than most, as intra-Asia is its traditional operating area and it has built up considerable expertise and a client base there.

In March 2012 the line announced its return to the North America-South America route, in conjunction with a number of other lines. Evergreen, NYK Line (NYK), Hanjin Shipping and Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM) jointly launched a new service between the US East Coast and South America, the Atlantic North South Service (ANS).

The company has also developed a role on the 'big money' routes, and has 12 Asia-Europe and 17 transpacific services.

#### Fleet

Evergreen Line has a fleet of 195 vessels, with a capacity of 948,869TEUs. The company owns 111 and charters 84 vessels. This translates to a total 413,978TEUs wherein which 43.6% of the company's fleet is chartered. The capacity of Evergreen-owned vessels is 534,891TEUs.

In terms of vessel capacity, its fleet is much smaller than its peers', with vessels mainly ranging from 1,038TEUs to 8,508TEUs, although in August 2014 it chartered *Thalassa Tyhi* for 10 years, its eighth 13,800TEU that was part of a 10-vessel charter agreement with Greece's Enesel, with all vessels to be delivered to Enesel and chartered by November 2014. Ten more 14,000TEU vessels were chartered as per charter agreements signed with Costamare and Shoei Kisen Kaisha, with each company providing five vessels to be delivered in 2016 and 2017 respectively. Evergreen's strategy of maintaining a large fleet made up of smaller vessels ties the carrier with intra-Asia routes, to which it is highly exposed. The company had previously seemed unprepared to make the leap into the mega-vessel class, a move undertaken by most of its peers. However, its orderbook shows it is prepared to take more vessels with an average capacity of 12,431TEUs.

The line's avoidance of ordering mega vessels appeared to be due to reservations by chairman and founder Chang Yung-Fa. He has been reported to be 'a noted sceptic about the industry trend towards far larger ships, believing that the need to fill them would end up driving down earnings'. This scepticism, however, appears to have been overcome, with Evergreen chartering significant number of 14,000TEU vessels. BMI notes that Evergreen is ensuring some protection, as it is chartering the vessels instead of owning them.

BMI believes Evergreen's decision to join the mega-vessel club will enable it to optimise its costs. It will also help the company to remain the number one container line in Asia.

Evergreen's orderbook, at 174,032TEUs or 18.3% of its current fleet, is 54,532TEUs greater than that of COSCON (at 119,500TEUs), meaning Evergreen should comfortably retain its lead. The change in strategy will also help the company move toward Chang's reported goal of 'steering Evergreen into becoming the world's largest container line in his lifetime'.

The company calls its current fleet development a 'fleet rejuvenation programme', which it started in 2010 by ordering twenty 8,000TEU-plus L-type vessels from Samsung Heavy Industries and followed by an order for 10 vessels of the same type from Taiwan's CSBC Corp in 2011. Evergreen also chartered five 8,800TEU vessels and 10 13,800TEU ships. 26 of the thirty L-Type vessels were delivered by August 2014, four more newbuildings are to be delivered by Q315 and 'two dozen' vessels will be gradually redelivered as their charters expire by the end of 2015.

Evergreen previously planned to build 100 container ships, but these plans have been put on hold until after the Panama Canal expansion project is completed, which is due in 2016.

### **Financial Results**

#### H114

Evergreen Marine Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd. and its subsidiaries posted a loss for the period in the amount of TWD1.51bn in the first six months of 2014, an improvement compared to the TWD2.53bn loss in H113. Operating revenue decreased by 0.5% y-o y to TWD69.5bn.

### 2013

Evergreen Marine Corporation (Taiwan) Ltd. and its subsidiaries recorded a consolidated net loss for the year of TWD2.05bn in 2013, an almost ten-fold increase of the TWD211.7mn net loss in 2012. Consolidated operating revenue decreased by 1.3% y-o y to TWD139.2bn.

### Q313

Evergreen Marine recorded a TWD48.5mn profit in Q313, a huge drop on the profit of TWD2.5bn posted in the same period of 2012, according to Seatrade Global. The liner's revenue decreased by 10.4% y-o y to TWD36bn.

#### Q213

Evergreen Marine posted a net loss of TWD400.5mn in Q213, compared to net profit of TWD 858.3mn in the same period of 2012, according to Seatrade Global. Revenue decreased by 2.54% y-o-y, from TWD37.45bn to TWD36.5bn.

### Q113

Evergreen Marine recorded a net loss of USD61mn in the first three months of 2013, according to Taipei Times, as reported by CargoNews Asia.

#### 2012

Evergreen Marine returned to the black in 2012, posting a net income of TWD128.53mn, compared to a TWD3.09bn loss in 2011. The company said it would not pay dividends.

# Q312 & 9M12

Evergreen Marine recorded a net profit of TWD104.15mn (USD3.56mn) for January-September 2012, and a TWD2.5mn profit in Q312. While it was in the black for the first nine months of 2012, profits were considerably lower for this period than 9M11, when the company saw a profit of TWD266.8mn.

### Q212 & H112

Evergreen announced a net profit of TWD858mn (USD29mn) for Q212. It reported an operating income of TWD641mn (USD22mn). However, it reported a loss of TWD2.4bn (USD82mn) in H112. This was compounded by an operating loss of TWD2.24mn (USD76mn) in H112.

#### 2011

Evergreen Marine reported a net loss of USD105mn in 2011. Revenue fell to USD514mn.

#### H111

Evergreen Marine managed to remain in the black in H111, unlike many of its peers, despite the fact that its profit declined by 61% to TWD1.39bn (USD48mn) from TWD4.03bn in H110. Its revenue fell from TWD8.6bn to TWD7.59bn, with the company attributing the decline to overcapacity and weakening in the economic recovery, which suppressed demand.

#### 2010

In 2010 Evergreen Marine registered revenue of USD3.5bn, up 39.9% y-o-y. This enabled it to return to the black, with an operating profit of USD403.1mn compared to a loss of USD473mn in 2009.

#### **Latest Activity**

#### **Enhancing Asia - South Africa Network**

Evergreen Line from October 2014 adjusted its joint FAX service with COSCO and contributed ships to the ASA service previously operated by K Line, MOL and PIL 'to offer a more comprehensive service' on the Asia-South Africa trade. Evergreen deployed two 4,200TEU vessels on both the FAX and the ASA service. The new port rotation of the FAX service is Shanghai - Ningbo - Keelung - Singapore - Durban - Singapore - Shanghai. The service uses six vessels with capacities of 4,200-5,800TEU. Evergreen's new joint ASA service's rotation is Kaohsiung - Xiamen - Hong Kong - Shekou - Singapore - Port Klang - Durban - Cape Town - Port Klang - Singapore - Kaohsiung. The service deploys seven 4,200-5,800TEU ships. The addition of a new joint service increases Evergreen's sailings frequency on the Asia-South Africa trade from weekly to twice-weekly and adds Keelung, Xiamen and Port Klang to its service network.

### **Upgrading Intra-Asia Service Network**

Evergreen Line and Mariana Express have launched a joint South China-East Malaysia (SEM) Service in September 2014. The weekly service uses two 1,000TEU vessels and rotates as follows: Shekou - Hong Kong - Kota Kinabalu (Malaysia) - Muara (Brunei) - Bintulu (Malaysia) - Shekou. Also, Evergreen

announced that in a slot swap arrangement it will take a space on Interasia Lines' Singapore - Yangon (Burma) - Malaysia (SYM) service. The SYM loop calls at Singapore, Yangon, Port Klang, Yangon and back at Singapore, offering additional feeder connection to Yangon to Evergreen's clients.

#### Adding Connections To The UK And Ireland

Evergreen Line enhanced its services to and from Dublin (Ireland) and Liverpool (Northwest England). The line now offers a twice-weekly service to Dublin and dedicated slots on a weekly basis to Liverpool from its hub in Rotterdam. Since the end of July 2014 Evergreen operates its own independent weekly shuttle service using 698TEU Vega Stockholms between Rotterdam and Dublin and uses slots on the X-PRESS FEEDERS' weekly Dublin service from Rotterdam. Also, as part of the same slot exchange, Evergreen takes space on the X-PRESS weekly service to Liverpool.

### Adding Third Far East-Middle East Loop

Evergreen Line added a third dedicated Far East-Mideast loop to its network through slots on the Middle East-Asia Express (MAX/MEX) service jointly operated by OOCL and COSCO, according to Alphaliner report, sourced from Schednet. The service has the following port stops at Shanghai, Ningbo, Hong Kong, Shenzhen-Shekou, Singapore, Jebel Ali, Dammar, Port Kelang, Singapore, Hong Kong and back to Shanghai utilising 8,000-8,500TEU vessels.

#### One More Samsung-Built L-Type Vessel Named

Evergreen Line held the naming ceremony for another Samsung-built L-type ship, with the 20th vessel in the series named *Ever Lucky*. The vessel, boasting a capacity of 8,452TEUs, was built at South Korea's Samsung Heavy Industries shipyard. The ship was delivered in July 2014 and joined Evergreen Line's Far East-US West Coast service. According to the company, the L-type's fuel-efficient design helps reduce operating costs.

Evergreen Group launched its new shipbuilding programme in 2010 with an order for 20 L-type vessels from Samsung Heavy Industries, followed by an order of a further 10 vessels of the same specification from CSBC Corp., Taiwan in 2011. The company also ordered 10 13,800TEU vessels and signed charter agreements for 10 14,000TEU ships. All newbuildings are scheduled for delivery by 2017.

# Sixth CSBC-Built L-Type Vessel Delivered

Evergreen Line has taken delivery of its sixth L-type vessel built by CSBC Corporation in Taiwan, the *Ever Loading*. It is the sixth of 10 such vessels ordered from CSBC in May 2011, each boasting a capacity of 8,508TEUs. The *Ever Loading* is 334.8 metres long, 45.8 metres wide, has 948 reefer plugs and a draught of 14.2 metres. The ship is owned by Evergreen Marine (UK) Ltd and it has joined Evergreen Line's Asia-US East Coast route after its delivery on July 29.

# COSCO Container Lines Company (COSCON)

#### Overview

COSCO Container Lines Company (COSCON) is one of the world's largest container shipping lines and is the largest Chinese carrier, outgunning rival China Shipping Container Lines (CSCL) in terms of fleet capacity.

COSCON is the container-transporting arm of China COSCO Holdings Company. The company dates back to 1961 and was originally engaged in transport solutions. It did not become a shipping company until 1993. In 2005 the firm issued an initial public offering (IPO) and now trades on the Shanghai and Hong Kong stock exchanges. China COSCO Holdings Company is the flagship and integrated platform of COSCO. The group is owned by the People's Republic of China.

#### **SWOT Analysis**

#### **Strengths**

- COSCO has a good relationship with the Bank of China, which has provided the company a source of credit since the 1960s.
- Its investment in a number of shipyards gives it the flexibility to adapt its order book to the economic climate.
- The carrier has a well-diversified fleet.

#### Weakness

• COSCON's parent, China COSCO Holdings Company, was in the red for the second year in a row in 2012, and only managed to post profit in 2013 mainly due to large sale of its assets.

#### **Opportunities**

- The opening of direct shipping routes between China and Taiwan is likely to provide long-term growth opportunities for COSCO's container operations.
- The group is well placed to take advantage of growing intra-Asia trade.

#### **Threats**

Ongoing overcapacity in 2015 will continue to drive down rates.

Strategy

According to COSCON's website, the liner operates 84 international shipping routes and 23 domestic services, connecting 162 principal ports in 49 different countries and regions.

COSCON plays a key role in domestic Chinese shipping, both coastal and on inland waterways. It operates six coastal services, 16 coastal feeder lanes and 72 routes on the Pearl River Delta and Yangtze River.

As a Chinese company, COSCON is heavily exposed to the intra-Asia market, which BMI believes is a growth area for shipping, particularly at a time when the more traditional routes are suffering from overcapacity. In addition to its domestic Chinese services, it also has a large number of services connecting Chinese ports with ports in other Asian countries, such as Vietnam and Indonesia. COSCON also has high exposure to the traditional East-West 'big money' routes of Asia-Europe and transpacific.

As well as unstable rates, the company has faced volatile bunker fuel prices. In an effort to combat this, it has introduced a number of bunker adjustment surcharges. It has also tried to introduce a peak season surcharge, but with vessel supply continuing to outweigh demand, this did not hold.

#### Alliances

BMI's view of an increase in link-ups between lines continues to play out, with the CKYH Alliance (also known as the Green Alliance) - made up of COSCON, 'K' Line, Yang Ming and Hanjin Shipping - first forming a partnership with Taiwan's Evergreen Line and later creating the CKYHE Alliance. BMI believes the development of alliances will put further pressure on carriers on the Asia-Europe route alone, leaving them with two options: join up or drop out.

The CKYH Alliance's link-up with Evergreen came into force in Q212, with the carriers operating a 12-loop service using between 96 and 132 vessels. In February 2014 the creation of the CKYHE Alliance was announced, with members agreeing in principle to establish a shipping alliance, which will be operational only on the trades between Asia and Europe, including the Mediterranean region. The CKYHE Alliance

commenced operations in the middle of April with six joint services operating between Asia and Northern Europe and four loops on the Asia-Mediterranean route.

Alliances are nothing new. They enable comparatively smaller players to operate on major trade routes, which they would normally be priced out of, if operating by themselves. In 2009 link-ups between lines became common and, as BMI projected, with the global economic environment once again turning sour, lines are joining up once more; although it should be noted it is now on a scale we have never before witnessed. The launch of the G6 Alliance highlights this, with members of the Grand Alliance (Hapag-Lloyd, NYK Line and OOCL) joining with members of the New World Alliance (APL, Hyundai MM and MOL) to create a super alliance of six members.

BMI believes it is due to the launch of this mega alliance, along with the link-up of MSC and CMA CGM on the Asia-Europe route, the continued dominance of Maersk Line and the attempt at creating the P3 Network by the world's three largest liners - Maersk Line, MSC and CMA CGM - that the CKYH Alliance has joined up with Evergreen.

Also, in Q412, further cooperation was announced between the two Chinese liners, when CSCL and COSCON announced that they were to operate their first joint domestic service linking north east China with Fujian and Shantao in the south. The move will protect the firms, as by working together they will dominate the country's coastal shipping sector, making it harder for outside shipping lines to break into the market. More news on cooperation between the two came at the beginning of 2014, when COSCO Group and China Shipping Group signed a strategic cooperation framework agreement, according to which the companies will cooperate in different areas, including shipping.

#### **Fleet**

According to AXS Alphaliner data, as of October 22, COSCON was the fifth-largest container shipping line in the world, with a market share of 4.4% - 0.1% higher than in the previous quarter. The company's container fleet has a capacity of 815,070 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs), up 3.6% on 786,585TEUs on June 26 2014. COSCON's fleet is made up of 160 vessels. The majority are Post-Panamax vessels with capacities of more than 4,500TEUs. The largest vessels in the COSCON fleet are the six 13,386TEU-capacity vessels, delivered in 2013 and 2014.

COSCON slipped from fourth position in 2012, when it was overtaken by fellow Asian container shipping company Evergreen. Although Evergreen has only slightly higher market share compared to COSCON, its

capacity is significantly larger by 133,799TEUs. We expect Evergreen to maintain its new position above COSCON, as it has a massive orderbook - 18.3% of its current fleet compared to COSCON's 14.7%.

Of its 162 vessels, COSCON has a fairly balanced ratio of chartered vessels, accounting for 40.4% of the fleet at 329,027TEUs. COSCON's own fleet of 99 vessels makes up the remaining 486,043TEUs of capacity. COSCON has ten ships on order, with a total capacity of 119,500TEUs.

#### **Financial Results**

#### H114

China COSCO Holdings Company's consolidated operating revenue was up 4.6% y-o-y, to CNY32.492bn in the first half of 2014. The company recorded a profit attributable to equity holders of CNY2.277bn, compared to a restated CNY0.99bn loss recorded for H113.

Revenue from container shipping and related business was up 5.5% y-o-y to CNY24.006bn in H114 but the segment posted a loss of CNY868.6mn for the period. Container shipping volumes were up 9.2% y-o-y, to 4.489mn TEUs. The average revenue was at CNY4,412 per TEU, down 2.5% on H113.

### Q114

China COSCO Holdings Company's consolidated operating revenue dropped by 6.8% y-o-y, to CNY14.209bn in the first quarter of 2014. The company recorded a net loss attributable to equity holders of CNY1.880bn, compared to CNY1.988bn loss figure recorded for Q113.

Container shipping volumes were up 7.2% y-o-y, to 2.079mn TEUs in Q114.

#### 2013

China COSCO Holdings Company's revenue from container shipping and related business decreased by 0.6% y-o-y, to CNY48,312mn in 2013. Box shipping volumes increased by 8.5% y-o-y, to 8.702mn TEUs. Average container freight rate was down 10.4% to CNY4,482 per TEU compared to 2012; in US dollars the decrease was at 8.8% to USD723 per TEU.

The company attributed its results to low freight rates as a result of continuing weak market demand and gradual delivery of large vessels creating oversupply.

Transpacific trade revenue decreased from CNY14.9bn in 2012 to CNY14.2bn in 2013; revenue brought by Asia-Europe trade including the Mediterranean dropped from CNY12.3bn to CNY10.7bn; Intra-Asia and Australia revenue also decreased - from CNY7.6bn to CNY7.4bn; while domestic Chinese revenue was up from CNY12.1bn to CNY13.8bn and revenue brought by other international trades, including the transatlantic increased from CNY1.7bn in 2012 to CNY2.3bn in 2013.

China COSCO Holdings Company's container shipping and related business remained unprofitable in 2013, with the segment recording a loss of CNY988.1mn, compared to a restated CNY1,528.7mn loss figure recorded for 2012.

### Q313 & 9M13

In the first three quarters of 2013 China COSCO Holdings Company's revenue from container shipping and related business decreased by 3.5% y-o-y, to CNY31.72bn. Box shipping volumes were up 8.4% y-o-y, to 6.425mn TEUs. The third quarter contributed 2.313mn TEUs (+7.8% y-o-y) in volumes and CNY11.38bn (-7.0% y-o-y) in terms of revenue.

#### H113

China COSCO Holdings Company's revenue from container shipping and related business decreased by 1.6% y-o-y, to CNY22,746mn in the first half of 2013. Box shipping volumes increased by 8.7% y-o-y, to 4.112mn TEUs.

Average container freight rate was down 10.6% to CNY4,526 per TEU compared to H112. The company attributed such a result to the demand which recovered slowly in H113, the continued oversupply, and market freight rates on the Asia-Europe route declining to historic lows. The company said that during the period it 'focused on adjusting the route structure' and developed emerging markets and the Chinese domestic market to reduce reliance on major European and American routes. The changes in routes and in the cargo source led to a decline in the average container freight rate but, according to COSCO, had a positive impact on the overall result.

### Q113

COSCON posted a revenue of CNY9.2bn for the first quarter of 2013, up 14.3% on Q112, as box volumes grew by 10.9% to 1,938,879TEUs. Transpacific trade revenue increased by 6.1% y-o-y to CNY3.25bn, even though container volumes were down 0.5% to 407,267TEUs. Revenue brought by Asia-Europe trade

including the Mediterranean amounted to CNY2.58bn, a y-o-y increase of 14.8%, as box volumes were up 5.5% to 420,425TEUs. Intra-Asia and Australia were responsible for CNY1.5bn of the revenues, 9% more than in Q112, and for an 11.4% increase in volumes to 460,905TEUs. Revenue brought by other international trades, including the transatlantic, was up 30% to CNY515mn, as box volumes increased by 13% to 79,804TEUs, while domestic Chinese revenue reached CNY1.15bn, up 30.7%, with container volumes amounting to 570,478TEUs - a y-o-y increase of 25%.

#### 2012

COSCON's revenues increased by 16.9% y-o-y to CNY48,446mn in 2012, compared to CNY41,437mn in 2011. Capacity grew by 13.3% and box volumes transported by the company were up 16.0%, from 6.91mn TEUs in 2011 to 8.02mn TEUs in H112. The highest revenues were earned by the transpacific trade services (CNY14,863mn, up 21.5% y-o-y), followed by Asia-Europe, including Mediterranean (CNY12,067mn, up 30.7%) and intra-Asia, including Australia (CNY7,318mn, up 14.3%).

#### H112

COSCON's H112 revenues were CNY23,117mn, a 14.1% decline from CNY20,265mn a year earlier. Capacity had grown by 6.3% and volumes transported by the company had climbed by 16.7%, from 3.24mn TEUs in the first half of 2011 to 3.78mn TEUs in H112. This ties in with the wider trend that BMI has been seeing, whereby volumes transported have risen but revenues and profits have continued to suffer as a result of overcapacity in the global fleet, which continues to worsen.

## 2011

COSCON moved a total of 6.91mn TEUs in 2011, an 11.2% y-o-y increase in volumes. Even so, the tough operating environment, in which excess capacity had driven down rates and high oil prices had driven up bunker prices and operating costs, meant that the company (like most other container shipping lines) recorded a loss for the year. COSCO's revenues from its container shipping segment were down 11% to CNY41.4bn, which contributed to its overall loss of CNY10.5bn (USD1.66bn) for the year, compared with a profit of CNY6.79bn (USD1.55bn) in 2010.

#### **Latest Activity**

#### Restructuring Asia To South Africa Service

COSCON together with Evergreen Line (EMC), Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd. (K-Line), MOL Liner Ltd. (MOL) Pacific International Line (PIL) in September 2014 announced the restructuring of their Asia to South Africa services. As a result, two jointly operated direct loops were created, one calling at South China, while the other one directly connecting Central China. The South China Loop and Central China Loop services commenced on October 9 and October 15 respectively.

The port rotation of the 56-day South China Loop is as follows: Kaohsiung - Xiamen - Hong Kong - Shekou - Singapore - Port Kelang - Durban - Cape Town - Port Kelang - Singapore - Kaohsiung. The loop deploys seven 4,200-5,800TEU vessels, with COSCON providing one of them, while EMC and K-Line provide two each, and MOL and PIL one vessel each.

The Central China Loop calls at Shanghai, Ningbo, Keelung, Singapore, Durban, Singapore and Shanghai. The loop rotates in 49 days and uses six 4,200-5,800TEU vessels. COSCON, K-Line, MOL and PIL each provide one vessel, while EMC provides two.

### 13,386TEU COSCO Denmark Christened

The naming ceremony for COSCON's new 13,386TEU container vessel, the *MV COSCO Denmark*, was held on September 16 2014. The ship will be deployed on the South China / U.S. Southwest Coast Express Service (SEA), calling at Taipei, Xiamen, Hong Kong, Yantian, Long Beach, Los Angles and back at Taipei.

The *COSCO Denmark* is the last in a series of eight container vessels ordered from Nantong COSCO KHI Ship Engineering Co., Ltd (NACKS) for USD166.8mn each in May 2008.

#### Five 14,500TEU Container Vessels Ordered

COSCO Container Lines and COSCO Asset Management signed a USD618mn contract for the construction and sale of five 14,500TEU container vessels with Shanghai Jiangnan-Changxing Shipbuilding Co. Ltd and Hudong-Zhonghua Heavy Industry on September 17 2014. The five vessels are considered as upgrade from

the same type vessels currently used by COSCON and are expected to be more cost-efficient and have an advanced level of environmental protection. The delivery of the five vessels is scheduled for 2017-2018.

### China COSCO Scraps Eight Vessels For USD20mn

China COSCO Holdings Company has scrapped four containerships and four bulk carriers for net proceeds of around CNY124.44mn (USD20.03mn), reports Seatrade Global. The vessels had a capacity of 331,294 deadweight tonnes. The containerships and bulkers were owned by COSCO Container Lines and China COSCO Bulk Shipping Company. The company has incurred losses worth CNY35.33mn (USD5.69mn) as a result of the disassembly of the eight vessels.

# **Macroeconomic Forecasts**

# **Economic Analysis**

**BMI View:** The Iranian economy will expand modestly over the coming years, and we project real GDP growth of 2.8% and 2.9% in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Foreign direct investment by Western companies will remain minimal next year owing to the failure to reach a breakthrough in talks on the nuclear programme.

The Iranian economy will expand slowly in 2015 as talks on the nuclear programme continue without reaching a breakthrough, and project real GDP growth of 2.8% and 2.9% in 2014 and 2015 respectively, from our estimate of a 2.9% contraction in 2013.

# **Sanctions Remaining Key Constraint To Growth**



Iran - GDP


e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: BMI, UN

International sanctions on the Islamic Republic's nuclear programme will continue to damage the country's economic outlook over the next quarters. We do not foresee a breakthrough in talks between the P5+1 countries (United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany) and Iran in 2015 following

an interim agreement signed in November 2013, and oil and banking sanctions will be only marginally eased. Moreover, while we expect President Hassan Rouhani's administration to undertake significant efforts to reform to the economy, the effects will be limited by a persistently opaque business environment, domestic resistance to opening up the economy and the slow political process. We project real GDP growth to average 3.1% over the 2014-18 period, compared to 1.6% over 2009-13.

Private Consumption Outlook: Consumer spending will remain modest over the coming quarters, and we expect expansion of 3.5% and 4.0% in 2014 and 2015 respectively. The inflationary environment will improve, but persistently elevated price pressures will continue to hit purchasing power. We project consumer price index (CPI) inflation to average 23.0% in FY2014/15 (fiscal year running from March 21 2014 to March 20 2015) and 21.0% in FY2015/16, compared with 35.6% in FY2013/14. Moreover, the government will be unable to increase current spending significantly in 2015, as it seeks to improve its fragile fiscal position by cutting subsidies and limiting previously universal cash subsidies to only low-income families (see 'Inflationary Environment Improving In 2015', September 18). The failure to reach a breakthrough in nuclear talks will also somewhat temper confidence in the economy among domestic and international investors.

# **Decline Not Enough To Stimulate Consumption**



Iran - Consumer Price Index Inflation, % chg, ave

f= BMI forecast. Source: BMI, Central Bank of Iran, Bloomberg

Government Spending Outlook: Spending on the healthcare, education and services sectors will be subdued over the coming quarters owing to the executive's efforts to tighten fiscal spending. This is not to say that the government will cut on spending on public services, as it seeks to maintain popular support to its rule. As an illustration, the Iranian Ministry of Energy signed an agreement with local water and sewage utility **ABFA** at the beginning of September to develop seven water and wastewater management projects for the value of IRR9.5trn (USD310mn). We project government consumption increasing by 0.5% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015.

# **High Demand Triggering Expansion**




Iran - Construction Industry


e/f = BMI estmate/forecast. Source: BMI, National sources

**Fixed Investment Outlook:** Capital formation growth will gradually accelerate over the next quarters, which we project to expand by 3.5% in 2014 and 5.0% in 2015. **BMI**'s Infrastructure research team holds a relatively positive outlook for the construction sector, which we project to expand by an average of 4.7% over the next five years, from 0.9% growth in 2014. The gradual increase in the expansion of the segment will result from a partial easing of economic sanctions, low base effects, increasing interest from foreign players and a high demand for infrastructure projects.

The automotive sector will remain a key beneficiary of the interim agreement reached in November 2013 between Tehran and the P5+1, when sanctions for the imports of auto parts were eased. Total production by local car manufacturers reached 399,846 units during the first five months of the current calendar year, a 72% y-o-y increase, and our Autos research team expects robust expansion in the industry over the coming quarters.

# **Benefitting From Interim Nuclear Agreement**






f = BMI forecast. Souce: IVMA, BMI

A host of factors will hinder a more rapid expansion of fixed investment. Foreign companies in nearly every sector have recently expressed interest in returning to the Iranian market, but we believe that Western companies will be unable to undertake major investment in the country due to the sanctions regime. Another key impediment will be Iran's difficult operational environment, with high levels of bureaucracy providing a significant barrier to trade and the utilities infrastructure struggling to meet demand. Iran scores poorly overall in the **BMI** Operational Risks Index, with 41.5 out of 100 ranking the country 13th out of 18 states in the MENA region.

# **Slow Growth In The Coming Five Years**

Iran - Components Of GDP (IRRtrn) & Real GDP Growth




e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: United Nations, BMI

Chinese and Russian firms will remain the main contributors to foreign direct investment in 2015. In particular, Russian firms have recently expressed strong interest in the Iranian market, reflecting improving relations between Tehran and Moscow. Russia will become an increasingly important economic partner over the coming years, even as the majority of projects will not come to completion due to technical and logistical challenges. On September 9, Iran and Russia entered an agreement to collaborate in the oil sector; according to Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak, Moscow is ready to carry out USD90.0bn worth of projects in Iran. In the same month, a memorandum was signed between unspecified Russian and Iranian firms for the construction of a pipeline stretching from Iranshahr to Chabahar in south eastern Iran, for an investment of approximately USD0.7bn.

# **Surplus Narrowing Steadily**

Iran - Net Exports




e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: BMI, UN

**Net Exports:** We project the net exports surplus to narrow significantly over the next five years. Export growth will slow in 2015 owing to a deceleration in energy production - oil exports accounted for 70.0% of total exports in 2012 - and we project total export growth of 5.0% in 2014 and 0.2% in 2015. According to the International Energy Agency, total oil production expanded by 4.5% y-o-y in August, compared with a 10.6% decline in 2013. Low base effects and an uptick in condensates exports - which are not subject to international sanctions - will lead to an acceleration of energy export growth this year. We are pessimistic that large-scale projects which could boost oil and gas supply will come online in 2015, and the sanctions regime will continue to hinder the hydrocarbons industry.

# **Production On The Mend...**

Iran - Oil Production




e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: EIA, BMI

The medium-term outlook for exports is also uninspiring. We project total exports to remain virtually flat over the 2014-2018 period, as rapidly increasing energy consumption will result in a decline of hydrocarbons export growth.

# ...But Five-Year Outlook Uninspiring

Iran - Oil Production



e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: EIA, BMI

A weak rial will lead to subdued import growth in 2015. Moreover, the country's dependence on imported fuels has decreased over the past few quarters owing to refining capacity expansions and fuel subsidy cuts implemented in April, and our Oil & Gas research team expects a slight decrease or stagnation in fuel demand over Q414 and early 2015 (see 'On The Cusp Of Refined Fuels Independence' September 11). We forecast total import growth of 7.0% and 5.5% in 2014 and 2015, respectively.

Table: Economic Activity (Iran 2009-2018										
	2009	2010	2011e	2012e	2013e	2014f	2015f	2016f	2017f	2018f
Nominal GDP, USDbn	365.7	429.4	527.3	550.6	481.6	428.7	477.4	515.7	541.0	571.0
Real GDP growth, % y-o-y	4.0	5.8	3.0	-1.9	-2.9	2.8	2.9	3.1	3.4	3.5
GDP per capita, USD	4,972	5,766	6,991	7,204	6,217	5,462	6,006	6,409	6,644	6,933
Population, mn	73.5	74.5	75.4	76.4	77.4	78.5	79.5	80.5	81.4	82.4
Unemployment, % of labour force, eop	12.0	13.5	13.3	13.1	13.0	11.0	10.0	10.0	10.0	10.0


e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: UN, BMI

# **Demographic Forecast**

Demographic analysis is a key pillar of **BMI**'s macroeconomic and industry forecasting model. Not only is the total population of a country a key variable in consumer demand, but an understanding of the demographic profile is essential to understanding issues ranging from future population trends to productivity growth and government spending requirements.

The accompanying charts detail the population pyramid for 2015, the change in the structure of the population between 2015 and 2050 and the total population between 1990 and 2050. The tables show indicators from all of these charts, in addition to key metrics such as population ratios, the urban/rural split and life expectancy.


**Population** 



f = BMI forecast. Source: World Bank, UN, BMI

# **Iran Population Pyramid**

# 2015 (LHS) & 2015 Versus 2050 (RHS)



Source: World Bank, UN, BMI

Table: Population Headline Indicators (Iran 1	1990-2025)						
	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015f	2020f	2025f
Population, total, '000	56,361	65,911	70,152	74,462	79,476	84,148	88,064
Population, % change y-o-y	na	1.6	1.2	1.3	1.3	1.1	0.8
Population, total, male, '000	28,807	33,504	35,917	37,656	39,915	42,307	44,213
Population, total, female, '000	27,554	32,406	34,235	36,805	39,560	41,840	43,850
Population ratio, male/female	1.05	1.03	1.05	1.02	1.01	1.01	1.01

na = not available; f = BMI forecast. Source: World Bank, UN, BMI

Table: Key Population Ratios (Iran 1990-2025)							
	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015f	2020f	2025f
Active population, total, '000	28,945	40,290	48,583	53,034	55,945	58,184	60,945
Active population, % of total population	51.4	61.1	69.3	71.2	70.4	69.1	69.2
Dependent population, total, '000	27,415	25,620	21,569	21,427	23,530	25,964	27,118
Dependent ratio, % of total working age	94.7	63.6	44.4	40.4	42.1	44.6	44.5

Key Population Ratios (Iran 1990-2025) - Continued							
	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015f	2020f	2025f
Youth population, total, '000	25,543	22,850	18,115	17,585	19,140	20,362	19,984
Youth population, % of total working age	88.2	56.7	37.3	33.2	34.2	35.0	32.8
Pensionable population, '000	1,872	2,770	3,453	3,841	4,389	5,601	7,134
Pensionable population, % of total working age	6.5	6.9	7.1	7.2	7.8	9.6	11.7

f = BMI forecast. Source: World Bank, UN, BMI

Table: Urban/Rural Population And Life Exped	ctancy (Iran 1	990-2025)					
	1990	2000	2005	2010e	2015f	2020f	2025f
Urban population, '000	31,748.6	42,210.8	47,393.5	51,332.8	55,362.4	59,374.4	63,078.7
Urban population, % of total	56.3	64.0	67.6	68.9	69.7	70.6	71.6
Rural population, '000	24,613.2	23,700.3	22,758.8	23,129.5	24,113.9	24,774.2	24,985.6
Rural population, % of total	43.7	36.0	32.4	31.1	30.3	29.4	28.4
Life expectancy at birth, male, years	61.2	68.7	70.0	71.3	72.8	74.2	75.5
Life expectancy at birth, female, years	65.8	70.6	73.1	75.1	76.6	78.0	79.2
Life expectancy at birth, average, years	63.4	69.6	71.5	73.1	74.6	76.0	77.3

e/f = BMI estimate/forecast. Source: World Bank, UN, BMI

1990	2000	2005	2010	2015f	2020f	2025f
9,312	6,316	5,483	6,555	7,146	6,751	6,148
8,905	7,552	5,476	5,416	6,507	7,116	6,729
7,324	8,981	7,154	5,613	5,487	6,494	7,105
5,822	8,800	9,247	7,215	5,643	5,466	6,474
4,697	6,932	9,143	8,993	7,067	5,595	5,424
4,054	5,315	6,859	8,704	8,726	6,997	5,541
3,535	4,442	5,202	6,521	8,484	8,649	6,937
3,030	3,886	4,693	5,210	6,497	8,410	8,579
2,123	3,372	4,112	4,833	5,262	6,431	8,333
1,620	2,857	3,421	4,032	4,757	5,193	6,353
	9,312 8,905 7,324 5,822 4,697 4,054 3,535 3,030 2,123	9,312 6,316 8,905 7,552 7,324 8,981 5,822 8,800 4,697 6,932 4,054 5,315 3,535 4,442 3,030 3,886 2,123 3,372	9,312       6,316       5,483         8,905       7,552       5,476         7,324       8,981       7,154         5,822       8,800       9,247         4,697       6,932       9,143         4,054       5,315       6,859         3,535       4,442       5,202         3,030       3,886       4,693         2,123       3,372       4,112	9,312       6,316       5,483       6,555         8,905       7,552       5,476       5,416         7,324       8,981       7,154       5,613         5,822       8,800       9,247       7,215         4,697       6,932       9,143       8,993         4,054       5,315       6,859       8,704         3,535       4,442       5,202       6,521         3,030       3,886       4,693       5,210         2,123       3,372       4,112       4,833	9,312       6,316       5,483       6,555       7,146         8,905       7,552       5,476       5,416       6,507         7,324       8,981       7,154       5,613       5,487         5,822       8,800       9,247       7,215       5,643         4,697       6,932       9,143       8,993       7,067         4,054       5,315       6,859       8,704       8,726         3,535       4,442       5,202       6,521       8,484         3,030       3,886       4,693       5,210       6,497         2,123       3,372       4,112       4,833       5,262	9,312       6,316       5,483       6,555       7,146       6,751         8,905       7,552       5,476       5,416       6,507       7,116         7,324       8,981       7,154       5,613       5,487       6,494         5,822       8,800       9,247       7,215       5,643       5,466         4,697       6,932       9,143       8,993       7,067       5,595         4,054       5,315       6,859       8,704       8,726       6,997         3,535       4,442       5,202       6,521       8,484       8,649         3,030       3,886       4,693       5,210       6,497       8,410         2,123       3,372       4,112       4,833       5,262       6,431

Population By Age Group (Iran 1990-2025) - Continued							
	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015f	2020f	2025f
Population, 50-54 yrs, total, '000	1,526	1,929	2,800	3,244	3,895	4,665	5,101
Population, 55-59 yrs, total, '000	1,393	1,431	1,766	2,637	3,109	3,788	4,548
Population, 60-64 yrs, total, '000	1,140	1,322	1,336	1,639	2,500	2,985	3,652
Population, 65-69 yrs, total, '000	898	1,145	1,257	1,279	1,550	2,340	2,813
Population, 70-74 yrs, total, '000	507	825	1,055	1,129	1,143	1,369	2,090
Population, 75-79 yrs, total, '000	269	508	654	802	876	902	1,105
Population, 80-84 yrs, total, '000	135	203	347	413	528	598	637
Population, 85-89 yrs, total, '000	48	66	112	172	216	290	343
Population, 90-94 yrs, total, '000	10	17	21	38	63	84	119
Population, 95-99 yrs, total, '000	1	2	3	4	8	15	22
Population, 100+ yrs, total, '000	0	0	0	0	0	1	2

f = BMI forecast. Source: World Bank, UN, BMI

Table: Population By Age Group % (Iran 1990-2025)							
	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015f	2020f	2025f
Population, 0-4 yrs, % total	16.52	9.58	7.82	8.80	8.99	8.02	6.98
Population, 5-9 yrs, % total	15.80	11.46	7.81	7.27	8.19	8.46	7.64
Population, 10-14 yrs, % total	13.00	13.63	10.20	7.54	6.90	7.72	8.07
Population, 15-19 yrs, % total	10.33	13.35	13.18	9.69	7.10	6.50	7.35
Population, 20-24 yrs, % total	8.34	10.52	13.03	12.08	8.89	6.65	6.16
Population, 25-29 yrs, % total	7.19	8.06	9.78	11.69	10.98	8.32	6.29
Population, 30-34 yrs, % total	6.27	6.74	7.42	8.76	10.68	10.28	7.88
Population, 35-39 yrs, % total	5.38	5.90	6.69	7.00	8.18	9.99	9.74
Population, 40-44 yrs, % total	3.77	5.12	5.86	6.49	6.62	7.64	9.46
Population, 45-49 yrs, % total	2.88	4.33	4.88	5.42	5.99	6.17	7.22
Population, 50-54 yrs, % total	2.71	2.93	3.99	4.36	4.90	5.54	5.79
Population, 55-59 yrs, % total	2.47	2.17	2.52	3.54	3.91	4.50	5.17
Population, 60-64 yrs, % total	2.02	2.01	1.90	2.20	3.15	3.55	4.15
Population, 65-69 yrs, % total	1.59	1.74	1.79	1.72	1.95	2.78	3.19
Population, 70-74 yrs, % total	0.90	1.25	1.50	1.52	1.44	1.63	2.37
Population, 75-79 yrs, % total	0.48	0.77	0.93	1.08	1.10	1.07	1.26
Population, 80-84 yrs, % total	0.24	0.31	0.50	0.55	0.66	0.71	0.72

Population By Age Group % (Iran 1990-2025)	- Continued						
	1990	2000	2005	2010	2015f	2020f	2025f
Population, 85-89 yrs, % total	0.09	0.10	0.16	0.23	0.27	0.34	0.39
Population, 90-94 yrs, % total	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.14
Population, 95-99 yrs, % total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03
Population, 100+ yrs, % total	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00

f = BMI forecast. Source: World Bank, UN, BMI

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